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T7PeT-v:CeTN

The problen of biblical interpretation is the relationship
between the text and the interpreter.

The stance that the exegete is

to take when he comes to the Christian Scripture is complicated by the
nature of the material.

It aprarently h.

es

2

twofold character which

can be illustrated in the expression "the Word of God, written."
On the one hand, this expression implies that the text is unioue.
Unlike other documents, it has a divine oririn as the "inspired" Word
from the Lord of the church.
written by men.

On the other hand, it is the Word of God,

In so far as it is written, it is a document suscepti-

ble to the principles of interpretatien cannon to other documents.

In

traditional language this is akin to saying that the text, in some sense,
2
The text is
has both a transcendent origin and an immanent origin.
both unique and objectively available for all men to examine.

The prob-

lem for interpretive methodology is haw to deal successfully with both
of these perspectives.
In this paper we will examine, in survey fashion, the hermeneee.

1 This division between interpreter, text, and author is used
because it not only covers every dimension of the hermeneutical situation
but lends itself to the current discussions of the post-Bultranniens to
be discussed later.
2

"While the former transcendence] holds God to be above man
and his world, the latter holds that God or the divine is within human
experience or within the world." John A. Hutchison, "Transcendence" in
ed., Marvin Halverson, Handbook of Christian Theoloev, (New York, 1958),
pp. 363-4. Once arein, the use of these terms with respect to the Bible
will allow a continuity with later discussions.

1

;

2
1
the natural
orthodoxy,
supernatural
by
tical prograns formulated
2
religion school, and the attempts to find an alternative to these
In the post-2nlightenment period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

A preliminary overview is in order to map out the direction

of the discussion and to suggest a common uncritical assumption held
by all major programs, viz, the use of non-biblical literary models for
interpreting the immanent character of the Scripture.
In orthodoxy, there was a tendency to emphasize the transcend'e•

ent origin of the text as the dominant principle for exegesis.

The

acceptance of divine authorship allowed the biblical literature to be
treated as a unity.

If "ultimately" there was one author, then a con-

tinuity of ideas could be aFsuned in the many wrItere•
With the emergence of the historical-critical method, the

4

dominant principle was shifted to the immanent.

A rationalistic stance

denied orthodoxy's al:peal to a !7:od able to intervene in history.

Ne

loner could one speak of a unified system of doctrine such as "the
theology of the Bible."

The authors of the various books vere

uals with conflicting thoughts of their awn.

It would be more arpro-

priate to speak of "the theolory of Paul" and "the theology of John..
Thus, the shift from the divine to the human brought with it a shift
from the unity of biblical teaching to its diversity.

If unity was Le

1

•

"Orthodoxy" has reference to the Protestant interpretation of
tbe Bible which accepted the possibility of divine intervertion into
history. This intervention included the miraculous activity of God on
behalf of his people and the communication of "inforeation" to his
"inspired" writers.
2

The natural religion school denied the miraculous intervention
of God preferring a rational description of the world in terms of unbreakable laws derived fro. science.

be found, a redefinition of the nature of the transcendent was needed
in terms of universal, ethical truths.
But just as orthodoxy did not adecuately deal with the immanent
diversity of the biblical text, so tha rationalists did not deal adequately with the uniqueness of the text as the professed, revelatory
Ward of God.

In so far as orthodoxy was concerned about a Program of

interpretation which would yield that God had to say to His church, it
sought to reproduce or "explain" what the Bible said. In so far as
rationalism became dominated by a substitute program of haw to make
the immanently interpreted text relevant to the "modern man," it abandoned any thorough programmatic attempt to reproduce the biblical content.

In a parlance which became ooeular at the beginning of the twen-

tieth century, rationalism sought to "understand" the text rather than
"explain" it.
What was common to both schools of thought was the methodological assumetion that the Bible was to be interpreted as any other historical document. i.;liat makes orthodoxy anpear characteristically
different from the rationalistic school was the nature of the nonbiblical literature with which the text was being ceenered.

The two

schools disagreed over the nature of the comparison not only because
they were working on differing world views, but because they were
operating differently off the models which were chosen to represent
the other extra-biblical documents.

1

Soth schools were interested in

"Understanding and "explanation" belong to a distinction made
by Wilhelm Dilteey and adonted 17
- sore theologians. Descriptive rsthods
were said to explain the literary content but another method was needed
in order to understand the "soul" of the vriter. See James M. Rotinson's
"Hermeneutics Since Barth," in The !;ew Fereeneotic, (New York, 1961;), p. 20.

L.
the "simplicity" cr clarity of the text and both were seeking, in some
sense, a descriptive or neutral approach to the Bible.
In 1835 with his publication of Leben Jesu, David Strauss
thcught, in true Heselian f'shion, that he had arrived at a proper synthesis between the supernaturalistic approach and thP rationalist turned naturalist approach as exemplified in H.E.G. Paulus.

What Strauss

saw as common to both schools was the acceptance of the reliability of
the eyewitness accounts we are supposed to find in the text.

After the

fashion of Reirarus, Strauss rejected the eyewitness -theory.

But where-

as Reimarus held that the text was then reduced to a deception on tho
part of the disciples who wrote it, Strauss appealed to the idea of
mytholoa.
Our contention is that Strauss did not provide a synthesis
between the two approaches, both of which seemed from thP standpoint of
nineteenth century "modern man" as doomed to programmatic failure.

Al-

though attention was immedietely paid to Strauss's view of m.mtholery and
the weakness of his position to account for its oririn and application
to the historical Jesus, the real weakness 1.-e shall centrnd is that
Strauss did not correctly identify the nature of the common elemPnt between orthodoxy and rationalism.

Surely, the eyewitness view-point was

important, but he missed an even more controlling influence when be
failed to examine non-biblical litersry models used as sources for hermeneutical principles.

In fact, the neo-Kantian liberalism which re-

jected Stranss, Also failed to perceive the basic problem of litprary
paradi7ms and was thus doomed to repeat the program of the old natural
religion school of rationalism.
The synthesis Strauss sourht had to wait frr the twentieth

5
century when Rudolf Rultnann -ould definitively challenge what h.,
:d
characterized bilical interpretation from the high point of seventeenth
century scholLeticise to the end of the nineteenth century exegetical
works of Ethical Ideal;se.

aulteann rejected the model of classical

literature as the paredien for immanent interpretation.
Strauss' inability to find the synthesis illustrates a point
for all exegetical proerams of the Fible:

when the interpreter seeks

a neutral hermeneutical progran by treating the text as he would other
historical docunents, he is actually reshaning the biblical text after
the non-biblical literary models from which the principles were derived.
In the history of biblical criticism, the application of these apparently
general principles" has resulted in a failure to "explain" the centents
of the biblical literature and in a redefinition of the transcendent
uniqueness of the text.
Having begun with the humanities and altered the nature of the
biblical transcendent, eventually the new transcendent rust, in turn,
reinterpret the hunanities:

Orthodoxy had adopted the "canons of human-

ism" for its philclogical method.

Nineteenth century criticism adopted

the historical-critical method of the so-called "new humanism."

Sensing

the need for 2 "general hermeneutic" which will be apelicable to all the
humanities, the post-aultmannian New Hermeneutic of Fuchs and Fbeling
has begun with a redefinition of the transcendent and seeks to use this
as a model for reinterpreting the nature of the hueanities.
After examining the conseouences of a stertine Point in the
humanities, we will want tc enolore 2 variation of the re-evaluation
of the liberal arts suerested by the New Hermeneutic.

I.

A.

HIMNISM:

TH7 REIFTERRRETATIOP OF THE
TEXT

The Hermeneutical Situation
of Orthodox Protestantism
1.

The Interpreter

Strauss, like a good many of
the nineteenth oentury critics,
1
belonged to the tradition of
Lutheran theology.
The supernaturalism
he vas rejecting had develo
ped a precise formulation of
doctrine by
emphasizing what we have cal
led the transcendent origin
of the text.
A common ground was assumed
between the interpreter and the
biblical writer. First, bot
h lived in a w)rld created by
God. Orthodoxy gave expression to thi
s belief in its "supernatura
lism." The same
God who created the world cou
ld intervene into its so-cal
led natural
processes. nracles such as the
resurrection of the dead were
then
possible.
It is this supernatbral int
ervention which also provided
a coramon program for the interpret
er and writer. Hoth were
chncerned with the
redemptive work of Christ and
the righteous life of the
church which
was supposed to follow.
In opposition to the sacerd
otalism of the Roman Church, Pro
testantism laid claim to the
immediate nature of God's
grace to the
2
believer without the mediation
of an institut!on.
This immediacy was
1

Jaroslav Pelikan in From LuTI
•n-r to Iierkegaard, (St. Louis,
1950), locates the contribut
ions of sirnificn.rt theolo
gians within the
Lutheran tradition.
2 B.B.

grfield, The Plan of Salvat
ien, (Grand !,ids),
6

DD.
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•
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also present in the individual believer's
Reproach to the Scripture.
Pather than derending on the authorit
ative interpretations of the
Cherch as institution, each man was allo
wed access to the text.

it

was a eevelation from God of what God want
ed each man to knew for his
1
salvation. Hence, its message was clea
r and simple.
Interpretation
took place within the context of a monologu
e between God and His
2
people.

2.

The Text

Crthodoxy had a Program which would reje
ct the fourfeld method
of interpretation used by the Roman Chur 3
ch and would allow for biblical
simplicity of meaning.

On the one hand, justice was done to the
tran-

scerdert origin of the text by claiming
the princinle of Sola Seriptura
4
or the "analogy of Scripture."
This expression stressed the unified
1 John
Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Reli
gion, trans. by
Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids, 1cg7),
2.e selection of the word "ronologue"
will contrast with the
later positions of "dialogue" between
the text and the interpreter.

3 The fourfold method consisted of the etym
ological or literal
meaning, the allegorical or worldly
symbolic meaning. The anagogical or
other worldly meaning, and the trop
ological or moral meaning. The first
two categories were applied to both
Scripture and secular literature.
A
description of its applicaticn is give
n by Tiiar K. Winsatt and Cleanth
Brooks, Literety Criticism: A Shor
t History, (New York, 1957), p. 147:
"...allegorical and etymological meanings
were naturally present in poetic
texts and deserved explication. For
here grammar was allied as a method
to view which we have already noted
in ancient philosophers, in Church
fathers as exegetes of the Scriptur
es, and in medieval theologians, the
view according to which the created
world in its radiant order and hierarchy is God's syrbolic baok. The
world is the shell or cover (cortex)
of an inner meaning (nacleus), the
veil over a hidden meaning, the entrance to such a meaning, the lower symb
ol of a higher meaning."
4
John Murray, "Intl-eduction" in Calvin's
Institutes. A current
exposition of the tern for biblical prea
ching has been given by Sidney
Greidanua in Sole Scrinture, (Kam
pen, 1570).

8
whole of the Bible which had
to be taken into consideration dur
ing
interpretation. r..xegeting "Scrip
ture b7 Scripture" rrevided a
unity
so that clear sections coul
d be used to explain the more neb
ulous.
However, it also meant that eve
n the clear passages could not be
treated apart from their ccn
text in the whole of Scrinture. In
a
pointed sense, interpretation
was theologically oriented.
On the other hand, this analogy
of Scripture was influenced by
the immanent approach. As the
struggles between the Protestant variations such as the Lutheran and
the Reformed intensified, the Script
ures
1
were treated primarily for
their doctrinal interest.
The necessity
of providing textual suppor
t for different dogmatic pcsitions has
been
2
popularly referred to as the
"rroof text" method.
!e have a prime example of
this approach in Philip Yelancthon,
the systematizer of Martin
Luther's theology.

Ls it was necessary

for Melancthon to nut Iuther
's scattered rronouncemerts into an
organized
form, he borrowed the rhetori.
cal structure of classification
from Cicero
3
called loci. 'eTe may summarize
this method as a topical arrangeme
nt of
material around a central the
me or unifying idea. It was necesF
ary for
the Lutheran church to know
what its namesake had to say about
Christology so one looked for the dat
a, the scattered pronouncements,
and
1

Albert Schweitzer, Paul and His
Interrreters, (New York, 1912),

2
Ibid.
3 See Pelikan, p. 32, for the
selection of the loci method as a
reaction by Lutheranism to
Aristotelian philosophy.
•••

C.

1
organized them around the locus of the persc
n of Christ.

Likewise,

the debate over the sacraments provided a locu
s, a central theme or
topic for organization.

The result goes beyond the Sentences of Peter

Lombard and gives the church the first thoro
ugh aprroach to a "systematic theolo7y"

born out of theological rhetoric.

Melancthon also applied the same loci method
to the biblical text.
The apparent topical arrangement of Paul's lett
Pr to the Ronars seemed
to easily lend itself to this kind of trea
tment.
for organizing theology, it became

A

ore than just a method

method for exegcsis.

This loci method which gives birth to syst
ematic theology and
continues to flourish in the church, was itse
lf born out of the classical
model of rhetoric.

t,',elancthon was rot the only theologian of the day

3

trained in the classics.

qhat characterized the work of Luther, Zwingli,

and Calvin was their grounding in
the classical literature.

In fat,

Zwingli was able to arrive at essentia
lly the same central teaching of
justification by faith alone, independentl
y from Luther's influence
4
because of his classical education.
What opened the text for them

5
was the philological study of the Greek
New Testament.

Eiblical ex-

A.C. McCiffert, Protestant Thought Before
Kant, (Yew York,
1962), p. 142. McGiffert also -mentions that Refor
med theology had by
this time a rival organization of Scriptur
e in. Calvin's Institutes.
Pelikan refers to the different approach
es called "analytic" and "synthetic" as used by the Reformed and
Lutheran churches respectively, p.
62f.
2
Pelikan, p. 79.

3

Pelikan,

D. 32.

4

John T. !icreil, The History and Character of
Calv-Inisn, (vew
York, 1967), pp. 30f.

5 Pelikan,

p. 30.

10
4
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1
humanism."
egesis was the apelication of the "canons of
Rhetoric and philology respectively shaped theology and the
exegesis of the Scripture. The text was actually interpreted as other
2
Put the other documents were classical literature.
historical documents.
That is, the principles for philological study were derived from the
classics and then treated as general rules applicable to all literature
In today's jargon, we would say they provided
3
It was a strong immanent prothe tools for a descriptive methodology.

including the Scripture.

gram but it took its toll in two ways.
First, the text itself and the writers of the text were shaped
by the classics.

Just as Yelancthon saw in the Romans epistle a "rhetor-

°cal" structure, so orthodoxy in general assumed that behind the epistles
lay a systenatic theology.

Just as the classical writers were rationally

oriented, so it was assumed that Paul could be understood by organizing
his letters.

Just as the classical writers worked with what we may call

a logical system,, so it was assumed that Paul too had a theology which
4.

was logically shaped.

The work or exegesis and biblical interpretation

led directly then into systematic theology or dogmatic interest.

The

union between Paul's thought and the thought of the later church would
1

RiOnard P. FeKeun, "Renaissance and Yethod," in Studies in OA
.History of Ideas, III (New York, 1935), pp. 71f.
2
Robert M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation of the
York, 1945), p. 131. Grant emphasises Luther's concern for
(New
Eible,
nroach.
the grammatical-historical
Iro

3

George Ladd, "The Search for Perspective," Interrretation, XXV
(January, 1P1), p. 48: "However, we wou3d agree with Stendahl thst the
first task of biblical theology is historical and descriptive: to expound
the theolory found in the Bible."
4

See Pelikan, n. 33 for the reintroduction of Aristotelianism
into Lutheran theology.

11
be found in the notion of system or rtorical structure of organization.
If one denied that behind Paul's writings there was such a system, the
alternative was not a structure of a different character, but a denial
of structure altoeether.

In that case, since a coon task could not be

found, theology became the work of the church.

If Paul as biblical

writer was not aware of the total scheme, at least the church could be.
From the unorganized data of the biblical text could come the structure
created by the organizing church.
The appeal to logical structure meant that all the biblical
writers were engaged in providing evidence for the same system.
result was a e7eneral "leveling" nrocess.

The

Emphasizing the continuity

and unity of Scripture becaese of its single divine authorship, the
immanent origin of the text became subsumed beneath ta•e transcendent.
The use of classical philolory die net adeqeetely previde for discovering
differences among the writers.
Secondly, to what extent is there a parallel between the productive or creative imagination of the classical writers and the biblical
writers?

Havine depended on the formal structural similarity of theol-

ogy and exeeesis, that is, the similarity in the ways both think, the
door has been opened for an identification of the classical imagination
with the imagination of the biblical writers.
by the natural religion school.

This second step was taken

The comparison VIPS elraady being made by

the seventeenth century mythoeraphers.
1
myths.

Mythography studies the criein and interpretation of ancient

12
:he :.riter
For orthcdoxy, the union between the transcendent and the
immanent origins of the text was found in a doctrine of revelation
with inspired writers as its recipient.

We need not argue that those

engaged in mythography in the seventeenth century were necessarily
orthodox in this respect.
cient Greek myths left the
1
with benefit.

Put the nature of their work with the anopen to the charge of studying heresy

The ryths then had to be justified to the Christian public in
such the same way they were justified in ancient Gre-ce itself. .n
book II (378d) of The Republic, for example, Plato taught that the
imnoral tales of mythology were actually allegories which the young
were not capable of understanding.

Euhemerus lent his mane to a type

of allegcrical interpretation which treated sone myths as fanciful des2
Behind the labors cf the mythcriptions of actual, historical events.
ological Hercules, one could expect to find the historical Hercules.
The actual deeds of this man had been so celebrated by poetic flattery

3
that it was difficult to distinguish the fact from the fiction.
:hat would allow for such moralizings or historical euests?
,
'
1

A. Zwerdling, "74.ythographers and the Romantic Revival of
Daa (September, 1964), pp. LAM
Greek Yyth,"
2
1.:insatt and Brooks, p. 78.

3 Zwerdling,

p. 448. The different. ways in which mythology
be found in Jean Seznec's The Survival of the
can
could be interpreted
methods applied by the seventeenth century
The
Pacan Gods, (1;ew York).
versions of the medieval inter7reta_
updated
mythegraphers were simply
the ancient myths were able to survive
that
thesis
tions. It is Sezneces
the !Addle Ages and become available for the renaissance writers only
because their literal meanings were sunplemented with "higher truths."

..PIIMMEM1001
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These types of exegeses operated with a particular view of poetic imag1
ination. ::ythology was the product of the poet. If we are to understand
what the mythology was "really" sayine, we would have to understand the
creative, ieaginative powers of the poetic author.

It -•'as the poet who

covered the historical events with embellishments.

It was the poet who

wrote an apparently immoral tale with a deeper meaning.
Hi

•

His sources for

imaginative expression were either moral or historical truths.

His work

was essentially one of illustration cr decoration of what could be arrived
at by rational processes.

In fact, the work of the poet's imagination

assumes the rational discovery or the moral principle or historical event.
h was poetic, and behind the poetic was a rational view of the world.
The method of exegeting Greek myths as the embellishments of
historical events, was adopted by some orthodox mythographers as an apol2
ogetical device.
If it could be shown tint the myths were poetic distortions of the actual happenings recorded in the Old Testament, then
the faith will be vindicated. The biblical tales became the archetypal

3
sources for the Greek imagination.
1
r

3

4 -1

See David Daiches' Critical Approaches to Literature, Crew
York, 1956), p. 24. Ry "poetic imagination" we will not limit cur?elves
to metrical verse. We will use poetry as literary critics do to stand
for the whole of imaginative orcreative literature. Literary criticism
will concern us in so far as it deals with theories about the nature of
art and theories about what constitutes the task of the artist. The
nature of poetic imagination will then depend upon the nature of noetry
as such.
2

Albert J. vuhn, "11,
7 nglish Deism and the Development of Romantic
Yythological Syncretism," F7•2_4., LXXI (December, 196), p. 1097. Kuhn
says: "Syrcretic mythology in the Romantic period had it? principle
roots in the seventeenth century Christian apologetics; but its character and form were dotermined primarily by English deism."
3 Yuhn, p. 1 1 M.

B.

The Hermeneutical Situation of the Natural Religion School

1.

The Interpreter

What carries over from orthodoxy to the natural religion school
is the loci methodolopy for theology and exegesis.
the dogmatic program of supernaturalism.

What does rot lagt is

Gradually a new "dogmatism"

is formed and a new program for interpreting the Scripture as historically
relevant replaces the program of listening to the transcendent words in
the immanent words.
It would be difficult to discover the roots of the natural religion
'S

We do know that after fighting on the battle fields and from
1
It
the lecterns, literature appeared pleading for religious tolPrance.

school.

may be helpful to use this generalization as a lead into the first stage
of the natural religion school.
In the seventeenth century, famous for its orthodox scholasticism,
also find a movement trying to unify Christianity. Let us call this
2
Surely, it was said, thPre
first stage "rationalistic supernat'lralism."
we

must be some things which believers may agree upon.

As reasonable men,

they should be able to search out tho common doctrines.
Of course, we cannot abstract this tendency from the rationalistic
direction of philosophy.
Wolff, and in

ngland

In Gerranv, we have the sc..sterl of Leibnitz and
dind the empirical tradition developing from

Hobbes and Bacon.
1

ilhelm Windelband, A History of PhilosoLhy, II., (flew York,
1958), p. 436.
2

i"hrt, n. 189.

15
John Tillotson, John Locke, and Samuel
Clarke all agreed that
not only could Christians unite over
common truths, but Christianity as
it is recorded in the Bible and defe
nded by the church could be reconci2
ed
with the products of natural philosop
hy. For Christianity, this means
that reason may dietingush between
vhat is essential to the faith and
what is non-essential. Surely, fait
h in Jesus Christ as the Yessiah and
repentence to lead a righteous life
are basic as over against the nonessential doctrinal trappings of
dogmatic or systematic theology. With
respect to Christianity and philoson
hy, we may say that the Bible es
revelation eupplenents the truths we
can arrive at by way of reason
1
alone.
In traditional language, this could
be called the difference
between special revelation as over
against reneral revelatier.

For
these men, the general revelation
could yield a natural theolce:y abstrtcted by reason, but there were
ear.° things which were "above reeson"
and could not be arrived at with
out the aid of revelation.
During the second stage of natural
religion, John Tindal, Thomas
2
Chubbs, and Thos Morgan developed
a form of Deism.
They believed that
Christianity and philoscphy could be
brought closer together by claiming
that what Was essential to the fait
h WS that which was derived from rea3
son alone.
Instead of using reason to suppleme
nt biblical revelation,
1
Mc Giffert D. 206. "He Locke) reco
gnized that there was much
in traditional Christianity cont
rary to sound reason, and he therefor
e
exaeired the Scriptures in consider
able detail to discover the essence
of Christianity as taught by Christ
and His apostles."
2
Windelband, p. 488. "...Toland is thei
r leader in so far as
he first undertook to strip Chri
stianity, that is, the univereel truths
of reason, of all mysteries, and
reduce it, as regards the enowledge
which it contains, to the truths of
the natural light, that is, to a
philosophical theory of the world."

3 Mc
Giffort, p. 217.
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reason now became the criterion by which Scripture vas 1udF7ed to be revelation.

Rationalistic sunernaturalism had tried to produce evidence for

revelation in the recorded miracles and in the fulfillment of prophecy.
If the essential nature of the faith was derived from reason, hoe-ever,
then the whole of Christian dogmatics ceuld easily be lost to the nonessential.
There were interesting apoloeetical reactions to this anproach.
Joseph Butler challenged the criticism of Scripture by comparing it to
the "book" of nature.

Since there were aenerent "flaws" in the so-called

rational structure of thine, why cculd not one overlook the difficulties
found in Scripture?

Taking a totally different aperoach, William

Law

denied any criterion such as reason which could be used to judee whether
a text was revelation.

Instead, he appealed to the self-testify'ng
1
authority of the record, itself.
It wes th criticism of 'r:ume, however,
which agreed with Butler's comparison between nature and Scripture, and
decided to abandon both in the name of skepticism.
Deism had a famous represertative in France with Voltaire.

His

position, however, was more of a nerative attack on the clerev than a
positive program of biblical-explanation.
In Germany, we find Reimarus and T.essing equally individual in
their development of Deistic themes.
is Immareel Kant.

1 !fcraffert, p. 231.

Most influential for later theoleery
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2.

The Text

We can best summarize the arproaeh of
rationalistic ;Teisn by
looking at its discontinuity with the
biblical text and then its continuity. Because it began with a natu
ralistic view of the world and
in the name of reason, rejected any spec
ial revelation, a gap was created between the biblical text
and its interprFter. The writer stood
in a world of divine intervention. The
interpreter belonged te the
law boundaries of the rachine. If one
took the rationalistic stance,
he separated Ilinself from the world
view of the biblical writers.
But the ver7
: rationalism which tore them asunder was
called
upon to unite the internreter with Jesu
s, himself, by reinterpreting
the nature of the transcendent. Acco
rdinr to rationalis-a s the text
was actually a misunderstanding of vho
Jesus was. He had an affinity
with modern man, for He was the rrea
t representative of the natural
religion school. Jesus calleo all men
to recognize the truth whIch
was before their eyes in nature. Jesu
s perceived the universal truths
and acted upon them, thus ibecoming
the prime exemnlar for ethical

4

action.

Just as the interpreter had to peer behi
nd the poetic emb01-

lishments of Old Testament mytholog
y to find the abstracted universals,
so the reader must understand the alle
gorical character of Jesus and
the telt.

McGiffert, p. 214. Tind:.1 is quoted as sayi
ng: *The cray
difference between morality and religion
is that the former is acting
according to the reason of things considered
in themselves, while the
letter is acting according to the sane reas
on of things considered as
the will of God."

I.
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3. The Writer
:organ illustrated his pcsition in universal truths with the
1
aperoach he took to the problem of eytholoey.
Whereas orthodoxy had
tried to locate the biblical stories as archetypes, Morgan reduce
d these
stories to myth alongside the Greek accounts.

This syncretistic approach

created the inclusive category of myth in reneral.

Finding historical

erchetypes

One could also claim

as not the only way to deal with myth.

as the ancients themselves had done, that myths were but
allegories of
moral and philcsophical truths.

An affinity could be found between the

classical rationalism which used the poetic as illustratiee
and modern
Deistic rationalism.

Instead of treating myth as the poetic account of

historical events, it was treated as a poetic account of ethica
l truths.
Greek mythology and biblical mythology together could, throug
h critical
eyes of reason, yield certain general truths which are comeon
to all men.
This was also the program of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who
formulated
2
his famous five points of Deism.
However, a reservetion had to be introduced.

nn one hand, one

say say that what is important are the uriversal truths
of mason and
history is merely contineent truth.
of biblical and Greek mythology.

This would allow an identification

But on the other hand, one cod not

say that there was no historical Jesus.

Christianity would then be

3nseparable from the religions of the world which concen
trate on pure
1
Kuhn, pp. 1101f.
2

Kuhn, pp. 11C1f. rcGiffert lists the five principles
Lord Herbert's De Relieione Gentilium, (16A3) "...that
there is
supreme God, that He cueht to be worchinped, that virtue is
the
cipal part of worship, that we ought to repent of our sins,
and
there are rewards and punishments, both now and hereef
ter." (p.

from
one
printhat
212).
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fictions.

The historical Jesus was needed as the exemplar, the concrete

possibility that such an ethical life could be realized by all men.
This then is the progran of the nitural reli-ion school.

Jesus

was relevant for man in the rational world by being the example of the
new transcendent realm of universal truths "revealed" through the natural
light of reason.

The method of discontinuity and continuity u2s based on

the controlling assurption of affinity between the imagination of the preclassical myth makers and biblical writers.

When appeal is made to myth

in general, Scripture is treated as other historical documents in a
truly immanent fashion.

But the transcendent is no longer unique, so

its claim to special status is ignored.

Concentration or. "understanding"

the text from a modern stance, no constructive progran is formulated for
an "explanation" or "description" of biblical theology.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy has shown the parallelism between this eighteenth century age of deism and the developments in classical literary
1
theory.
Both of then were rooted, he claims, in the same rationalistic
&lieu of the Enlightenment.
could be expanded.

We have suggeste

how this comparison

Having adopted the classical philology common to

ortnoaoxy, the natural religion school then went on to adort th

clas-

sical view of poetic or creative imagination and further subsume the
Bible under the classical image.

That is, from orthodoxy came the

comparison between classical literature and biblical literature, and
from the natural religion school came the compa.rison between the classical theory of poetic imagination and biblical imagination.

paving

abandoned the doctrine of divine inspiration for Scripture against the
1

"The Parallel of Deism and Classicism," Yodern Philoloe7, XXIX
(Februnry, 1932), pp. 231-99.

7
4*
•
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backdron of supernaturalism, the only apparent category
left for an
immanent origin of the Bible was poetry.

Not being, able to compete

with the truths of science and natural philosophy, Script
ure became
poetic truth.

Such theories of poetic truth rightly belong to lit-

•

erary criticism and in this case a classical view.
From orthodoxy, the loci method carried over into the nineteenth century biblical criticism.

From the natural religion school,

the program of universal truths carried over thoug
h the mediation of
Kant to become specifically a transcendent, ethical princ
iple.

The

distinction continued between what was essential ir the
text, that is,
what was acceptable to rationalism, and what was non-esse
ntial because
it was unacceptable.

We may note that this parallelism between the bibli
cal mentality
and the poetic imaeination forced biblical exegesis
into an anthrenological discussion of the idea or revelation and inspi
raticn.

It is true

that orthodoxy's doctrine of inspiration emphasized the
subjective character of revelation, but the kind of descri
ption given to it by the
natural religion school altered its basic intention.

Revelation and

inspiration became biblical ways of saying "Poetic inspi
ration" or
creativity.
Eut if one begins with this view of revelation as
poetic inspiration, then one misses the impact of the large numbe
r of instances for
which revelation is not concerned with the subjective self-dis
closure
of the writer, but rather an objective, cosmi
c, historical, and even
physical self-disclosure of God.

If the Parouria of Christ is not the

paradigm for Paul's view of revelaticn, it is at least
significant
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enough to make us hesitate in idertifying his own 'theory" of revelation with a totally internal and subjective view.

What underlies Paul's

our subjective self-disclosure is the objective revelation which will
1
take place in the End Times.
In fact, the revelatory character of this
outstanding climactic event of the Old Testament Day of the Lord becomes
the revelation and manifestation and shaving forth and making known of
the Lord, himself.

In so far as Christ has become as the first phase

of that Day, He reveals God. In so far as Paul receives the Spirit of
that cosmic event, then he is able to interpret its meaning to the
church.
Both Paul and Peter are workina with a contrast between the
2
what underlies their
Foundation of the world and the Ind of the world.
usage of the words "reveal," "'manifest," and "make known in showing" is
that what was God's secret or mystery was hidden from the Foundation of

3
the world but in the 'i2nd Times will be revealed.

At the consummation

But the 'r]nd Times have begun with the resur1
rection of Christ as He vat the imae of the Father. Paul, living in
God will unveil Himself.

Times, has received the Spirit to proclaim the nature of Goes
the 2nd
.
hidden mystery and therefore interpret the work of Christ and mal:e
4
known the plan of God.
1
Cf. I Corinthians 1:7: and Colossians
2

I Peter 1:5; 20.

3 Cf. Romans 2:5; 16:26; and Colossiars 1:26.
4
Cf. '-'phesians 3:4-12: and Titus 1:3.

II.

A.

THD NF4 FPYArISY:

T" REIWURPR-TATIOF

TFE TEXT

The Hermeneutical Situation of Nineteenth Century Criticism

1.

The Internreter

Rationalism had taken two frrrs throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.

In Germany, it followed the Platonic empha-

sis on mathematics in the philosophy of Leibnitze and his disciple Wolff.
In England, it was emnirically rooted in the scientific tradition.
Applied to the philosophical Problems of epistemology, these two
apprngches appeared to be antithetical.
German rationalism began with the
mind.

A

nriori knowledge in the

Py way of the ontological argument for the existence of the

Good God, some rationalists could guarantee the identical structure
1
='..mviricism claimed it could F7uarantee that
world.
the
and
of the mind
identity by avoidina the a rriori categories and letting expPrience
write upon the tabula rasa of the mind.
Burets skepticism of the empirical tradition challenged Kant
to awaken from his dogratic slumbers and attempt the revolutionary
synthesis of these two streams of thought for epistemology.
It is not what he s7nthesizes which attracts our attention in
biblical interpretation, but rather the nature of the synthesis itself.
This framework was directly related to the classical program of rationalism and supernaturalism as

as to the schools of criticism which

See Albert G. Ramsnerger's "Farly Yodern Rationalism" in History
of Philosophical 1:vstrms, ed. V. i=rm, (Ycw Jerse7, 1965), pn. 240-52.
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were to follow him into the nineteenth century.

:o.nt provided a
,

philosophical framework for the reinterpretation of the nature of the
transcendent.
Earlier, we mentioned that in trying to do justice to the
transcendent and the Lmmanent characteristics of the biblical text,
the older philology with its loci method unconsciously structured the
Sole Scripture after its own image.

With the coming shift to the

historical-critical nethod, the usurping of the transcendent would be
complete.

The question to be exanined is, to what extent can one intel-

ligibly speak of the transcendent?

it be, as the eighteenth

century rationalists had said, the realm of universal truths?

A new

philosophical framework vas needed to allow for both a throughly
immanent critique of the text, and yet at the sane time, preserve its
uniqueness as the Word of God.
To this end we need to know of Kant's distinction between the
phenomenal and the nounenal realms.

The first was the area of science.

It elaborates the presuppositions of Newtonian science as it was concerned with description and explanation of the physical world.
phenoeenal realm was also called the ectypal realn.

This

It begins with

the multiplicity of experience and through a network of theoretical
connections based on cause and effect approximates the One or the
Whole,

whenever this ectypal !eind of reasonine sought to incorporate

the Whole and sec the unity of nature, the result was antinomy.
The categories of phenomenal or ectypal reasoning did not
apply to the realm of the nounenal or the archetypal.

Since the notion

of cause and effect and connective laws were located in the mind as
structuring categories

Qr

our experience, it may be the e*se that man
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is actually free in his moral acti
ons.

The archetypal is the area of

man's freedom of will but it is also
the area of ultimate unity.
T::e can see that in so far as the
study of philology as science
is anplied to the text of the Scri
pture, it exanines that aspect of
the text which is open to phenomen
ological investigation. The transcendent is actually the archetyp
al which is approached through Kant's
ethics of the categorical impe
rative. Having translated the transcen
dent
into the noumenal, he made room
for "faith" beside knowledge. But
this gave the transcendent an anth
ropological character in so far as
it manifested itself in man's life
as moral duty.
Kant applied this phenomenal-n
oumenal structure to the task of
1
theology and exegesis.
A twofold distinction was made between
the
philological approach to the text
and the philosonhical.

The first

recovered what the text had tc
say. (Not only did Kant stand in the
natural religion school, but the
idea of philology which he used was
strictly the eighteen:h centurY
rationalistic approach. For Kant, it
was merely the critical stud
y of ancient texts and languages. The
2
philological revolution which
was in the air had not effected him.
)
The philosophical approach
to the text attempted to discover
what the text "meant." The stan
ce was that of the modern rational
istic man who was unable to
accept the biblical world view of supe
r1

In his Introduction to Schweitz
er's The :vest of the Historical
Jesus, (New York,
Sdition), James M. Robinson discusse
s Kant's
distinction betaeen philolor
y and rhilosophy. He also mentions
that in
the beginning of the twentiet
h century, Hans Windisch saw criticis
m as
having carried out Kant's prog
ram. See p. xvii.
2
H. Holborn, "vistcrY and the Stud
y of the Classics," Journal
of the History cf Ideas,
U'' (January, 1953), n. 43: "Kant defi
ned
philolegy in a very typical
eighteenth century fashion as to critical
knowledge of books and 1ar7
uar^s."

1968

S

5
naturalism, but yet seeks to know whether the Bible has any meaning for
him.

Instead of the monologue which orthodoxy had envisioned between the

text and the believer, Kant saw a dialogue between text and interpreter.
Philologically one read what the text said, but philosophically, what
it said could be used as a vehicle to modern man in his own situation.
The text then became a receptacle, or in his own terms, the vehicle for
1
the presuppositions of the reader.
The Kantian program stayed with the Biblfical criticism of the
nineteenth century.

It was the central accusation of Albert Schweitzer,

as he studied the critical lives of Jesus and theologies of Paul, that
without exception Jesus and Paul had been re-created in the images of
A corollary to this critique is the failure to con2
struct a descriptive New Testament Theology.

the interpreters.

4
2.

The Text

Toward the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth,
a cnange was taking place in the character of philological stpr;ies.
change can be seen illustrated in the work of the mythographers.

This

Instead

of using their studies in an apologetical fashion, the scholars sought
1

Karl Barth, Protestant Thouht:
(New York, 1959), pp* 155f.
2

From Rousseau to Ritschl,

Schweitzer, t'aul and His Interpreters, p. 237. About Pauline
studies Schwcitzer says: "Te?riters went to work with an almost Inconceivable absence of plan, and wanted to offer solutions before they had
made clear to themselves the scope of the problem. Instead of seeking
a definite diagnosis, they treated the symptom separately, with whatever means happen to come to hand."
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1
objectivity in the so-called "dictionary" approach.
their stance

Instead of taking

ithin the church, they appealed to a neutral or descriptiv
e

method to avoid value judgments about their mythologic
al subject matter.
This objectivity prepared the way for what we would consi
der to be the
more truly "scientific."
Yythography was only part of the total picture.

The study of

the claasics as a whole was changing.

The widely used "canons of human2
ism" was becoming the "new philology."
It was no longer adequate in
dealing with ancient texts to limit the scope
of philoloey to the critical examination of language and text.
Gibbon had studied the fall of the Roman empire by searc
hing for
the original sources of the event.

Imeressed by this nethod, Niebuhr

3

imitated it for the study of political movements.

it the subject

matter was not to be limited to political history
alone.

Philologists

were impressed by the need to see the ancient texts
in the total context of the cultural situation and began to emplo
y the source critical
4
approach to reconstruct the environment of the dccum
ents they studied.
The older philology of gramar and rhetoric was in the
process of becoming the new philology of historical criti
cism.
1

Zwerdling, pp. 452f.
which merely listed the tales.

Kythographers compiled reference works

2

Holbern, p. 43: "Ranke and most other German histo
rians of the
first half of the nineteenth century vere train
ed in classics and the
rethods of criticism and interrretation which, the schol
ars of the classics
had developed from the foundation of resea
rch in modern and medievnl
history."
-) Holborn, p. 42.
4 e .
eolpern, p. 43. F.A. Wolff is mentioned as one
who called for
theetudy of background materials in irterpreti
ng clacsical literature.
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When philology was linited to something rough
ly parallel to
1
"textual criticism," orthodoxy heartily absor
bed it as essential to
its hermeneutical program.

Phi1olor7 was the neutral or descriptive

or explanatory science applicable to all
documents irrespective of
orip-4 n.

Put now the new philology of historical criti
cism looked into

the very origin of the text as part of its
explanatory program. It
examined the situational context from which
the ideas and form of the
text ;,rose.
If historical criticism was indeed interested
in looking into
the cultural milieu, then it might be expec
ted that the distinction
between classical and biblical literature
would he seen.

The new

philology provided a tool for exwsing the disco
ntinuity between the
two kinds of vriting.
But on the other hand, since the method was
formulated in Its
efforts to understand the classical milie
u and its documents, this
new approach to an immanent methodology
would assume that biblical
litrature could be understood and analy
sed in the sane fashion.
Could it be that the model for te histo
rical-critical study of the
biblical text was the historical-critical
study of the classics?
The goal of the new philology was the produ
ction of a new
humanism which would be broader than the class
icism of the past and
2
include universal history.
The method was moving philology beyond
1

Textual criticism has two major functions.
EYternal criticism reconstructs the best possible text
using extant manuscripts.
Internal critie!sm is a literary analy
sis which determines the best
reading on tle basis of its coherence
with the author's ideas expressed
elsewhere. See Bruce M. Metzger, The
Text of the New Testament, (Few
York, 1964).
2

See Holburn, pp. 140f.
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the classical model to inccrporate all literature not only as possible
objects of study but as contributions to the new idea of humanism.
Rateer than drP;.r values from classical antiquity alone and universalize
fron these values, the historical method would provide for a true
universalism of subject matter.
The older philolory was assumed to work descriptively alongside
the confessional statement that Scripture was divine in origin.

Ye

have already seen that there can be no carefully mapped out area for
the transcendent and the Immanent.
whole text was viewed.

They are different ways by which the

The philologically immanent approach encroached

transcendent, however, and using tiee c1assic:11 model of lit-

upon th

erature it structured the biblical text and its theoloeies.

That older

philology which found expression in the loci approach never ws a neutral
or descriptive method in itself.
How much more so is this the case with the new philology?

The

need for general hermeneutics is broadened beyond the classics to incorporate all literature.

It is a radically immanent concern which ercroached

upon the transcendent just as surely as did the older philoloy.
how to preserve the transcendent and speak intelligibly cf the
was supposedly supplied by Kant's theory of the ncunenal.

Word of

iiut what could be said about the imagination of the biblical writers?
If criticism followed Kant, it would make sense to continue an alleeorical
version.

2ut with the new humanism of the historical methcd, criticism

cculd no longer use the classical imagination as a paradigm for all
cultures.

A new understanding of imarination in Feneral was needed.

The tension which remained in ninetePnth century criticism was
the effect to evnthesize the Fantian tranrcendent with the new vice? of

99

imagination required by the historical method.

3.

The 'writer

a.

Schleiermachar

The need for a n-w understanding o' the vritr's imagination
was ro-t. by Friedrich Schleiermacher.

he accented the historical method
1
d hence felt compelled to reformulate the doctrine of revelation.

The problem, suggested above, was how to combine this new view with tJ,e
•e•

Kantian transcendent.
The first thing Schleiermacher is noted for is the emohasis he
2
gives to the nature of Christianity as a positive historical religion.
This is important against the background of the natural religion school
which focused or the abstract universal truths common to all religions.
Christianity and Christ in particular, served as the paradigm of those
truths.

Schleiermacher called attention to the contribution made by

Jesus in the history of religion and centered on his individuality rather
than his generality as

nhood par excellance.

His second contribution is related to the romanticism in his
thougnt.
so h

Just as hP accented toe new philology of historical criticism,

separated himself from the rationalistic and classical view of

poetic imagination.

The roots for understanding His interpretation of

revelation lay in this shift Prom the classical to the remantic.
It used to be that the labels "classical" and "romantic" were
set up as antithetical.
1

This opposition seemed to suggest a dependence

Alan Richardson, The

pp. 79f.
2 -.
nichardsen, T. 91.

)
„,

744

in the Are of Science, (London, 1961),
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1
.
caustion
upon a model derived from physics to explain historical
Today we see the romantic as the next stage in an evolution or process.
h
The seeds of the romantic movement were already present in the eighteent
century period of neo-classicism.

If we try to define the relation-

ship between classicism and romanticism as the contrasts between didactic and hedonistic or cognitive and emotional, it will always seem
that they are but half of the total picture.

Taken together they would

yield a cmorehensive theory of literary criticism.
-va)en we indicate that there is a definite tension between the
labels of "classical" and "romantic," we are referring to their views
of creative imagination.

For examnle, Gilbert Highet points out the

romantic use of Greek mythology and thereby establishes a continuity
emphabetween the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. ;:ht will be
sized in our discussion is the discontinuity between the centuries over
the nature of Greek myth.

The same tales were used by both schools

but their significance had changed.

To discover the nature of this

new significance, we may follow the suggestion of Morse Peckham.

At

the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth,
2
l.
humanitie
the
in
a "cultural convergence" was taking place
The apparent inadequacy of Rationalism to deal with real life
plus t'ee shock of the French Revolution, reduced the Machine-like wend
of the Enlightenment to a "wasteland."

On this wasteland, the arts and

philosophy were trying to build by seeking a new orientation.
Peckham feels it is useless to attempt a reduction to Kant as
1
PP. 355f.
2
p. 160.

Gilbert Highet, The Classical Tradition, (Oxford, 1949),
Forse Peckham, Eevond the Traeic Vision, (rew York, 1962),
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the primary influence.
a transition.

The whole of the humanities was roing
thrnugh

It conld be summarized as the shift away
from the ex-

ternal world as the source of value and
meaning to a new found,tion in
the self. Kant was but the philosop
hical articulation of this coon
re-orientation.
This new understanding of the sources
of value was to combine
with the new conceetions of folk-poetr
y and myth.

Douglas Bush points

out,
Herder widened and deepened the conc
eption of the improvising
bard Homer by linking it with his
general tnaory of Volkslieder.
Not only were saga, Yarchen, and myth
, all prodncts of te folkmind confron ed with natnre, but
poetry, myth, and religion were,
if not quite identical, at any rate
closely related.'
This re-orientation in the source of
value and in tie very
nature of imaginative literature can
be brought out in the contrast
between the neo-classical and the so-c
alled ronantics.
In the neo-classic are in England, as
we have seen, mythology had
been atrophied through being cut
off from religion and "trnth".
The Augustan Deists had found in natu
re a revelation of God, but
they had in general failed to ra-creat
e the mythological imagination, though some direct cr indi
rect disciples of Shaftesbury...
did have a "primitive" vision of a
mythological world. Now in
Germany, mythology of 211 kinds gained
a new derth and inwardness
when it was seen as not only a prim
itive but a permanently fruitful phase in the religious evol
ution of humanity...Thus abont
a set of widely various but related
impulses, fron advancing Greek
scholarship to a new primitivistic
conception of the imagination,
of nvth, of nature, and of reli
gion, these made not only possiblio
but inevitable, a revival of poet
ry inspired by a rich mythological
synbollsm.2

leeo

Among the Ger:an romantics who grew
out of the Storm and Stress
period, Schleiermacher plays an inpr
rtant role with his nerception of
rvthclogy and the PazrtantIc Tradition in
English Poetry,
(Cambridge, 193?),
a.4

2

Plash, pp. 47, 49.

ee
the universe.

His ideas spread among his friends to influence Schelling

and Schlegel on poetry and Harderburg on religicn.

Cskar Wazel shol.,s us

how Schlelereacher's ideas were applied.
...Schelling Ileld in 1801 that no vork of an artist could rival the
absolute work cf art, the universe. Here Schleiermacher's religious
adoration of the universe was used to fathom Poetry. Poetry of
poetry depends upon the relation to the universe, to the infinite.
All poetry, therefore, is allegorical, or better still according to
cur usage, symbolic. By means of an inlaZe, poetry reveals the
infinite...Poetry and the poetic were very closely bound up vith
the rood of yearning. Yearning aims at something higher, at the
infinite. That striving after the infinite which was peculiar to the
rational-minded romanticist was reflected in poetry. Thus poetry became analogous to love in the romantic sense. In it a man approached
infinity; in poetry the absolute became experience to him; in nething
finite, considered from Schleiermacher's point of view, was the ¶nfinite more immediately present than in poetry. At this point in
romantic thought there was indicated most impressively that, and ehy,
life and thought, nature and philosophy had to become poetry fer the
romanticist.1
Later, Hardenburg tried to lead Schleiermacher's position into
a new religion and develop a new mythology.

Others confused the religlols

and the aesthetic which Schleiermacher had tried to keep seperate.
This somantic school to which Schleiermacher belonged had its
roots in the Stern and Stress period led by Herder, Schiller, and
Gopthe.
Herder, supposedly came into contact with Kant when the philosopher
was
awakening from his ramous slumbers into a variation of skepticism.

This

depreciation of the pure reason is what led Herder into irratio
nelirm.
When Kant recovered from his period of doubt and incorporated
empiricism
into his philosophy, reason was secured but his infle,
!nce on Herder had
ceased.

The fully awakened Kant was studied by the romantics such as

Schlegel and thus they never sought the irrationalin of the Storm
and
Stress.

German Romanticirm,

: York, 193?), pp. 72, 74.
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Herder's position at this point was similar to Rousseau's
for both held that the careful examination of the emotions by the
1
reason could only lead to the loss of the emotional in analysis.
The romantics, on the other hand, having learned the importance of
reflection from Kant, were able to excell in two areas of emotional
reflection, viz., art and religion.
Although SchleiFrmacher had his influence on the German
romantic school's formulation of poetic theory, he did not propose to
reduce religion to aesthetics.

Both the aesthetic and the religious

were treated as emotional responses.

Both were objectifications of

emotion through the use of symbolism.

The rational could not graFp

reality but it could reflect Peon the emotional intuition which ccald
grasp it.
In religion, this intuitive grasp of rality was Schleier—ac!er's
2
reinterpretation of revelation.
Instead of discovering the archetypal
perspective of Kant by means of the categorical imperative, Schlelermacher
apppaled to the use of "retigious experienee.'
Religion, for Schleiermacher, is the perception of the universe.
First, man must see that the inflnite is manifestP:1 in the finite and
separate out that notion of infinity.

Then he :Trust rasp the presenee

of infinity in specific finite things, such as

an himself.

Nan is

*religious" when he discovers the infinite which is within him.

Vait

expression of that infinite manifestation is found In the conscien0e.
Throughhis own ethieal task dictated by the cerscience, man wills she
infinite

ill as he rills ethically.

1 Wazel,
p. 12.
Richardson, rp. 821%

Ls he acts, the infinite will is

carried out in the finite world.
The doctrines of Christianity are then the objectifications of
this religious erherience or revelation.

An analysis of Christian

dogma will reflect the emotional basis or foundation in the affections.
The grasp of the infinite results in the religious feeling of dependence.
If thus the direct inward expression of the feeling of absolute
dependence is the consciousness of God, and that feeling, whenever
it attains to a certain clearness, is accompanied by such an expression, but is also combined with, and related to, a sensible selfconsciousness: then the God-consciousness which in this way has arisen
will, in all its particular formulations, carry with it such determinations as belong to the realm of the antithesis in which the s-nsible self-consciousness moves. And this is the source of all those
anthropomorphic elements which are inevitable in this realm in
utterances about God...1
2
Christ becomes the archetypal image of humanity.

By union

through intuition with this image, we are reconciled to the humanity

from which we feel ourselves estranged. With religious experience as
the essence of dogma, we can then use it as a criterion to test the
doctrines.

The dogma is true in so far as it is an objectification of

this intuitive awareness.
Whereas Schleiermacher was using this apparent psychologism to
become aware of what was bey-end his reason to grasp, Karl Barth sees

3
Ludwig Feuerbach as "reversing" this methodology.
and Feuerbach were engaged in interpretation.

Both Schleiermacher

But whereas Schleiermacher

centered on the affections in hope of dealing, with what was basically
1

Friedrich Schlniermacher, The Christian Fe-1th, I, (hew York:
Harper Torchbook Edition, 1967;), p. 25.
2

See Richardson, p.

2.

3 See Karl Barth, "Tntrodhction" in Luehhig 7euerbach's The
Essenee of Christianity, (New York: warner Torchbook Fdition,
p. ra.
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external to him, Feuerbach removed the objective reality and reduced
these synbols to predicates about man.

Instead of being responsive

affections from without, religious language became projections nrom
within.

They are counter claims and what else can be said?

SchellinT

called Feuerbach's philosonhy, ono cf a bad conscience.
To avoid this kind of reductionism, Schleiermacher either needed
to make religious symbolism irreducible symbolism which could he only
explicated in terms of other symbols (Schlegel's "poetry of noetryl")
or provide a framework for interpretation which could do justice to
both the anthropological and the transcendent.
In so far as theology reorganized itself around the criterion
of

ehleiermacherts religious experience, he casts his shadow over the

remaining nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
•- 71ssentially, however, Schleiermacher was alone in his union of
romantic symbolism with historical criticism.

The romanticism which

supported his view of revelation and hence biblical creative imagination
4
was not incorporated into the theological interpretations. For a true
heir to his position, biblical criticism had to wait until the twentieth
century.

b.

Strauss

rehat made it possible for David Strauss to conceive of himself
as a synthesis between rationalism and supernaturalisn was the Fegelian
1
philosophy which formed the framework for his thinking.
He read Hegel
but he heard both Schleiermacher and F.C. Baur lecture at the University
1

Albert Schweitzer, The Chiest of the Historical Jesur, p. 80.

lc
,o
of Berlin.

It was Eaur's historical-critica
l exanination of the origin
of Christianity combined wit Heg
h
el's idea of the I.:pit-Geist whi
ch en1
abled Strauss to construct his
Leben Jesu.
Baur himself had been under the
influence or Schleiermacer but
soon round an affiliation lit
h the Hegelian philosophy. It
allowed
Baur to examine the historica
l origin of the Christian faith
by working with the triadic View of
historical develepment. Fichte
and Hegel
had seen the advanceeent of
history as a clash of ideas whi
ch were
resolved in syntheces only to
meet new oppositions. Baur fou
nd that
conflict for cho,
-ch history in Paul's letter to
the Galatians where the
2
apostle to the Gentiles speaks
of withstanding Peter to his
race.
Could it be, Baur reasoned,
that Peter, the representative of the
primitive
Jewish elenent of Christian
ity, was seeking to uphold the ide
ntity of the
Jews through the observance
of the Cld Testament law, but Pau
l, the
missionary to the Gentiles was
preaching universalism and freedo
m due to
tht, nature of his mission field?
en the basis of Hegelian histcry,
this
must be the case.
The book of Acts, on the oth
er hand, reveals no ideational
conflict.
Even the dispute mentioned
in Galatians is not recorde.d. whe
n this is
offered kS counter evidence to
the conflict theory, it is onl
y because the
opponent of Hegelianierm has fai
led to grasp the triadic moveme
nt. If
Peter's primitive Judaism is
the thesis and Paul, the missio
nary to the
1

Stephen Neil, The Interpretati
on of the New Testament,
York, 19(A), p. 13. In a not
e, Neil cites J.G'
Yummel's
information that Baur was inf
luenced by Niebuhr's history of
Rome.
•
2
The main biblical texts were
Galatians 2:11f and I Corinthians
1:12. Neil outlines Baur's
pesiticn and then gives a hintnr
y of thp
English reaction to Baur's tra
nslated work in 1860 (pp. 23f
).

1961, (New

1e61-

Greeks, is the antithesis, it must
be that the book of Acts is a
second century document testifyine
to unity in the guise of a peace
proposal. Tt is an unhistorical
work, or better, a work slanted by
the purpose of the writer. It is
written with a particular Tendenz
to smooth the conflict. Thus, far
from being counter evidence, Acts
becomes the unity which was arrived
at in the synthesis of the Old
Catholic Church.
Since, on this interpretation, Paul
has been identified with
the Gentiles or Greek mission fiel
d, who will object to saying that
Paul represents Hellenistic Chri
stianity as over against the Primitive
Jewish interpretation? Who will
object to interpreting Paul's contrast
between spirit and flesh after
the formal similarity to the Greek con1
trast of body and ssul? Who will
object that the real meaning of "spirit"
In Paul's writines is more than
the Greek notion and is actually an in..
perfect attempt to arrive at Hege
l's World Snirit? The Greek nature
or
Paul's thought became an assunpti
on of nineteenth century criticism, but
2
Baur's translation of Paulinism
into Heeelianism was a minority opin
ion.
We need to notice that Baur
used the new philology but in terms
of the triadic structure of
Beeelian Philosophy. We need to noti
ce that
the Greek origin for Faulinisn
was not derived fro"' a careful stud
y of
the text but rather was dictated
by the Hegelian framework for a phil
osophy of ideational crigins.
Under the leadership of the historical
critical method, a variatio
n of the classical model made a direct
entrance.
Pauline theology does not mere
ly bear a formal similarity to Greek
ideas.
1
2

Schweitzer, Paul and His Intercre
ters, p. 15.
Ibid., p. 20.

They are identical.
This was the background for the work of Strauss.

As he in-

terpreted the action and reaction of orthodoxy
and rationalism, he
identified a common assumption for both schoo
ls.

Unlike Baur, both

schools were assuming that the text was relia
ble information based on
1
the accounts of eyewitnesses.
(Ev n Schleiermacher, who accepted a.
2
historical methodology, assured the basic
reliability of John's C'ospel.)
Rationalism had separated the text with
its supernaturalism fron the
interpreter.

In the name of a program of universal truths,
it was

forced to separate the historical Jesus
from the textual account.
Trying to support this distinction by showi
ng how the Gospel writers
misinterpreted the natural phenomena, only
led to the implication from

3
Paulus, that the writers were naive beyond
believability.
This impasse could only be overcome by follo
wing the lead of
Baur and coming to a completely different
view of the text as a whole.
The very nature of the literature itself had
to be questioned.
irterpretation of the imagination of the write
rs was needed.

A new

Strauss

said that interpretation was mytho
logy.
1
Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus,
p. 78.
2
Ibid., p. 66.

3

Daniel P. Fuller, Faster Faith and Histo
ry, (Grand Rapids,
1965), p. 39: "This rationalistic proce
dure, however, obviously failed
to make Jesus an example to be imita
ted. It pictured Him as an impostor
who deliberately deluded His disciples
into thinking He vas a supernatural
person. Hence, in Paulus the full impli
cations of Rationalism became
evident. What man should know about God
and what duty reauired of man
found no supnort whatsoever in the
Jesus of history...According to Rationalism, therefore, man could find in
history no surpert for building a system
of ethics. Instead, he must look away
from history and concentrate his
attention unon the categorical imper
ative of his own soul."

39
d
;- :ith this interpretive principle, Strauss moved Loth forwar
and backward at the same time.

In so far as he appealed to a thorou11

pated the
going re-evaluation of the whole text as mythology, he antici
theological discussions of the twentieth century.

Even though F.C.

century, the
Baur dominated the first two-thirds of the nineteenth
long run.
stature of Strauss was to become the more influential in the
But Strauss' view of mythology was also a. step backward.

It

have called
was a return to t!-e older view of poetic imagination which we
the classical.

His position

WS

not the same as Schleiermacher's romantic

The mythological idea Strauss
1
ghly.
thorou
adopted had been applied to ti!et Gospels before, but never so

intuitive ;:rasr, of the archetypal infinite.

Myth

it
had been applied to the Old Testament before but since

ent did not
was assumed to be isolated from Christology, the Old Testan'
effect the rationalistic program.

When Strauss used myth, he was adopting

Gabler.
the method used in Old Testanent studies by Fichhern and

Behind

cal philolotheir method lay the work of an eighteenth century classi
gist named Christian Heyne.

2
g.
Behind Herle, was the philosophy of Lessin

Heyne's area was classical mythology.

He tried to formulate a

t poets.
theory to account for tie creative imagination of the ancien
In classical fashion, behind the poetic was the rational.

Lessing had

that the human
taught him that primitive man stood as unenlightened but
1

Schweitzer, The `Nuest of the Historical Jesus, p. 78. Hers.
birth and
tofore, myth had formed the "two lofty gateways" of the virgin
d streets
crooke
and
w
"narro
the resurrection, between which one found the
of the naturalistic explanation.*
2

"Introduction" to The ;mast, of the Histerical Jesus,
Robinson,R
on Christian Hartlich
D. xiii. The discussion is based, at this point,
Biblical
and i:alter Sachs, 7re Crigin of the Concert of Yyth in vodern
Research, (1952).
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race was in the process of education.

Primitive men, such as the

ent in rational
,?k poets, could not canablv interpret their environm
Gre,
categories of abstraction.

Their thought was concrete and filled with

The myths were thus allegorical, for instance, of the natural

images.

processes of the vend.
ical
In the hands of Strauss, this classical idea of mytholog
rationallanguage could be used nnt against the backdrop of the Deistic
ism he was rejecting, but rather against the Hegelian rationalism.
Rationalism and classicism 7o hand in hand.

When the primitive Christians

power of His
came into contact with the unioueness of Jesus and felt the

"a!

personality over their lives, they searched for an exp/anatior.

Berg

prirdtive Pnd incapable of abstraction, they selected fren their ovn
the absolute
francs of reference the poetic way cf saying Hegel's union of
They could not think the abstract "Godmanhooda
1
of
God."
"Son
concrete
the
thought
instead
so

Spirit and the finite man.

The alternatives vere laid at the feet of the nineteenth century
critics.

Romanticism as a movement appeered to be dying. If critics

a
chose the classical view of poetics, they aeeeld have to assune as
supperting and interpreting structere the Hegelian system.

They fled

from Heeelianism but mainly from mythology, only to embed themselves
deeper into the classical position.

With it they returned to the most

sophisticated pre-Hegelian rationalism they knew, viz., Kantianiem.
The synthesis between supernateralien and rationalism vas never
really achieved and yet it was rejected.

Failing to criticize the roots

literary theory,
of the alternatives and discover the foundation laid in
1 The quest, of the Historicel Jenust p. 79.
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the Last- Strauss eeroid becane a meth
odological confusion.
In rejecting the framework of Hegel,
critics listened to
Albrecht Ritschl.

He had withstood the Hegelian history
of Baur in

1850 by rejecting the notion of conf
lict in the early church with a
1
Catholic synthesis.
Instead, the church was to be understo
od as an
evolving history. Process was maintain
ed but evolution replaced the
triadic logic.
It is Ritschl's program of ethical
idealism which structures
the remaining critics of the nine
teenth century who stand outside the
post-Baur Ultra-Tubingens. ?icking
up the thread of the positive historical religion given by Schleiermach
er, Ritschl placed it within the
evolution. of history and saw the unfoldin
g of the kingdom of God, or
2
in his terms the moral integrat
ion of humanity.
Schleiermacher's
interrretation of revelation as a roma
ntic approach to religious experience, is then placed in the framewor
k of a rationalistic ethical idealism. Dogma is not the objectificat
ion of the intuitive grasp of the
archetypal whole. Rather, it is the
3
objectification of value judgment
s.
There is no auestion of metaphysics.
The biblical judgments have nothing
to do with existence.
Since the program for the relevancy of
Jesus to the modern man
is located in His life as the ethical
example, criticism must reject the
thoroughly mythical a.erroach and arrly
the historical-critical method
Faul and His Interrreters, p. 16.
2

Richardson, r. 65. Details to Schleiernach
er.
and Ritschl nay
be found in H.R. Vacklntosh, ?Tee
s of Yodern Theology: Schleiermacher
to
Barth, (rew York, 1937).

3

Richardson, pp. 85-6.

to recapture the actual Jesus of history.

Because Strauss was net

willing to side with roeanticism in his view of poetics, he could
offer
no positive program of the relevancy of Jesus outside the
Hegelian
1
fortress.
As criticism turned away from Schleiermacher and Strauss,
a new view of imagination would be needed which would
allow for the
historical nethod aeainst the backdrop of a Kantian transcendent
.
To save the ethical exemplar, Lach-lann surrested the two source
2
theory cf the Gospels.
Not everything needed to be called "fanciful".
One could still discover a historical foundation
fcr the Gospel records.
What has become known as the "synoptic problem" pointe
d to the narellel
passaees in the first three Gospels.

Mark ate-pears to be the simplest

form while Matthew and Luke appear to exnand these simpli
cities.
was probably then an earlier written source used by the
others.

Mark
Since

there were other parallel passages in Matthew and Luke dealin
g with the
"sayings" of Jesus which were not found in Mark, the same formul
a of
simplicity and complexity was used to Posit an encanonieal
"source" Q.

The last half of the nineteenth century then bore these cross
currents.

From orthodoxy, the critics still applied the lcci method,

particulery when dealing with the theology of Paul.

This method main-

tained its correspondine influence on the structure of the text
and the
text and the doctrinal dispositicn of the writer and
interpreter.

-ram

the older rationalism of the natural religion school, the
program of
ethics was supported against the background of the ethica
l idealism of
1

The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 88.
ven within his
Heeelianism, Strause did net offer a connection or ideas in the
Gospels.
2
Ibid., p. 88.
ww•••••

••1••••

3
neo-Kantianisn.

The !:ew Testament writers wer
e assuned to be classical

in their attempts to
say what was basically rat
ional.
Fron tho new philoloi-y,
however, historical criticism
was refired into a source cri
ticisn searching for prinitive
documents in the
Gospels and borrowed cul
tural ideas in Pauline studie
s. The inability
to find coherent thinki
ng in either the Gospels or
epistles led to a
source criticism of Pau
line literature and the int
rusion of cultural ideas
into the Gospels.
From Romanticism, the bas
ic imaginative position of
Schleiermacher's religious experi
ence was carried over but cha
nged into a rational approach of psy
chological motivation to fit
the neo-Kantian
philosophy. The key to
Paul, for example, vas said tn
b in 1-:-;.1 trau1
matic experience on the
road to Damascus.

c.

Schweitzer

In his historical rarvey
s of Gesuel and Pauline critic
ism,
Albert Schweitzer challe
nmd the degmatic stance of
Kantian ethical
Idealism. The focus of bib
lical criticism had necessori
ly been directed to the anthropol
ogical character of the sys
tem of thought Predl:ced by a writer suc
h as Paul. The urogramatic
interest in ethics
dictated what was to be
considered as essential in
the apostle's
theology. When the tensio
n was seen between the forens
ic principle
and the principle of
transfcrmation unto comtletio
n, the transformation
prirciple was considere
2
d to 'DP
because it
s ethical.
--re
1

Paul anl His itterpret
ers, pp. 58-.40.

2 Ibid., up. 15f.
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forensic notion of justification by faith
was only an earlier phase
of his ethical thinkieg to be replaced
in his later development by the
transforration of santification. The
cosmic and physical notion of
redemption which surely aprears in the lett
ers, was subsummsd beneath
the ethical interest and treated as eith
er the earlier phases of his
thought or as illustrative of his ethi
cal premise.
:lather than make Paul palatable to the moder
n man, Schweitzer
1
sought to discover the tree nature of the
apostle's thought.
If a
program for uncovering what the text actu
ally said, was to be successful, the consequences would include a
loss of relevency for the rsader.
Schweitzer found the key for his studies
in the cosmic interpretation
which he called the eschatological.

He then traced this idea through

both the Gospels and Paul to find the
structure criticism had missed.
To re-create the Pauline theology, Schweitz
er believed, attention should be given to the auostle's
view of the consummation at the
2
return of Christ.
He criticized the critics for not bcthering
to

3
arrange Paul's statements about the
Coning into a coherent Pattern.
Apparently, criticism had not been interest
ed in the rel;-tion
of events at the second coming.

Yuch of what Schweitzer then vent on

to construct sounds vaguely familiar to
anyone with an aquaintance
with the second coming time charts of
orthodox pre-millenialism.
Instead of merely reproducing unrelated
doctrines as the
nineteenth century critics hed done, Schw
eitzer insisted that the
James
Robinson, The Yew Quest of the Eistoricel Jesu
s,
(London, 1959), p. 34.
2
Paul and His Internreters, n. 238.
Structural significence
is riven by Schweitzer to the ressurec
tion of Christ and His Pareuaie.

3 Ibid., p.

work of description was not completed until one cculd perceive the
1
inner connection or logic of Paul's ideas.
Fverline had shown Paul's mind to be controlled by cosmoloricnl
interests.

Schweitzer then fixed his attention on the delay of the

Parousia as explanatory for the adjustments in the Pauline syeten.

The

presence of the spirit in the church was not to be compared to the Greek
parallels.

It was rather to be understood in the eschatological sense

as the presence of the Eo7y Spirit as the earnest or downpayment of the
Spiritual blessing which was yet to come.

Schweitzer annealed to the

work of Herman Gunkel on the nature of the "spirit" in Pauline studies.
By simply examining the Pauline usare of the term, Gunkel had shown the

3

discontinuity between the apostle's thought and Greek philosophy.
With this eschatological interest, Schweitzer found Paul's mind
to be controlled by a mystical union with the Soirit as represented in
the Christian sacraments.

In ornosition to the Relicioneeschichtlich

Schule, Schweitzer argued that the sacraments could not be derivative
4
For such parallels with Greek thought,
religions.
of the Greek mystery
he held, one would have to check the writings of John, not Paul.
The church history of the renowned Adolf liernack was eppenled to
by Schweitzer as evidence for the non-Hellenistic character of Paul's
theology.

If the apostle had synthesized his thought with Greek phil-

1 Ibid., p. 169. E.E. Ellis notes Schweitzer's development of
the eschatolcgical connection in Yew Testament thoueht from Kabisch and
Ludemann. See Paul and His Recent internreters, (Grand Rapids, 1961),
p. 25.
2

Ii

Ibid., p.

57.

3 Ibid., pp. 78f.
4

Ibid., pp. 1814'.
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osophy then why was he rej
1
ected by the theology of
the Greek Church?
Schweitzer may have abendo
ned the relevancy of the New Tes
tament for the mcdern man but
not for Schweitzer. It jus
t so happened
that he was a mystic and
so were Jesus and Paul. At
least for Schweitzer
the text continued to be
significant.
Why was Schweitzer not
accepted?
study was rot accepted.

This is not to ask why his

The work of Schweitzer and
Wrede

as initiative
of the whole eschatolo
gical school of interpretati
on which we call the
"history of redemption.*
Rather, we ask, why did not
modern theology
become mystical? (Perhaps
some would argue that it did
to some extent.)
Our contention is that Sch
weitzer saw many things cle
arly but not
2
the full imnact of litera
ry theory on the critics.
The programs which
were established from
the seventeenth century cn
were closely connected
with the theories of poe
tic imagination which were
used to achieve an
immanent hermeneutic. Whe
n Schweitzer separated him
self from this tradition, he was alone. His
mystical stance to interpret
the transcendent
meant that the theology
of 'Paul could not be exp
licated for the modern
1
reader. Schweitzer rec
aptured a unicue character
to the text but lost
the immanent contact wit
h the critical interpret
ers. Mysticism has no
philosophical framework oth
er than its own intuition
s by which religious
language can be translate
d intc non-,mystical langua
ge.
It may be that mysticism
and romanticism are related
as wazel
1
2

Ibid., ep. 31f.

Schweitzer makes use of
terns such as "philology" and
erary criticsm" but the
"lity both refer to the text its
elf and do not lead
to aesthetic implicati
ons. On the other hand, Sch
enitzer is on example
of how philology itself
was moving to historical
criticism. S1r,
for examrle, a noted his
torical critic, is tl.n one
who "takes the first
Steps upon the road of
literary hypothesis;" Panl
and
His Interpreters,
p. 7.
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1
says they are.

If so, then Schweitzer's intereretati
on of the biblical

writer is in the tradition of
Schleiermacher.

But Schleiermacher could

at least explicate the intuitiv
e objectifieations of religious expe
rience
in teres of an emotional psycholo
gy. Schweitzer is his silent heir.

B.

The Bermeneuticel Situation of Rudo
lf rultmann.

1.

Interpreter

The mystical silence of Schweitzer
had to be overcome if the text
was to be both explained and unde
rstood by the modern man. The stan
ce of
nineteenth century critics in a rati
onalistic philosophy had produced a
tension between the transcendent and
the immanent. If the transcendent
was defined in Kantian terms, then
the writer had to be classical.
Put
the examination of the text required
a writer who was not classical.
EnmanticisA or mysticisn seemed to
dc a better job characterizine the
biblical imagination. Put if the
writers were like romantics, then
what could be said about the tran
scendent which could be universally
relevant to all men at all periods
in history? It is difficult to
explicate romantic insight.
A new anproach was needed.

To deal adeonately with the nature

of the biblical imagination, a new
definition of the transcendent was
needed. A new philosophical fram
ework was needed which would allo
w for
explication without a reduction
to rationelise and classiciem.
Such a philosophy was apparently avai
lable in existentialism.
This philosophy would hopefully
allow criticism an alternative to the
1

eernan Ronenticisr, pp. 6. Arou
nd 1700, Shaftsbury is said
to have revived Flotinus.
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Kantian transcendent, to continue a thoroughly immanent histor
ical
method, and do justicc, to the romantic tradition of biblical
imagination.
According to Paul Tillich, the philosophy of exberiencing
existence began with the 1841-2 lectures given by Schell
ing to an
1
audience which included Eierkegaard, Bakunin, and BurCkh
ardt.
Schelling could trace the roots of his "positive philosophy"
to the work
of Pascal, Jacobi, Haman, and Boheme.
The approach was replaced by the neo-Kantian idealism or naturalistic empiricism but reappeared in the 1880's as the Philos
ophy of
Life in the works of ',:ietzche and Dilthey.

The impact of Dilthey on

contemporary theology in the Bultmannian tradition is
undeniable.
In a third stage of Existence Philosophy, Tillich groups together thinkers like Husserl, Heidezger, and Jaspers.
'6e do not find discussions by Tillich, Bultmann, or Reinho
ld
Niebuhr cn the influence of romanticism as a method of
symbolism or an
apt:roach to the "ultimate" in their own works.

All three clearly react

to the rationalism of the older liberalism but do not elaborate
on the
nature of the alternative choice.

For Bultmann, romanticism was
2
portant for sugFesting historical relativity.
Niebuhr sees it as

3
emphasizing the individual as over against the universill
essence.
Both Tillich and Niebuhr &scuss romanticism largely
from the perspective of the nation in Hegel and !!,--rx.
1,
iheoloFv and allt%re, (New York, 1964), pp. 27f.
2
History and Srchatolary, (Few York, 1955), p. 83.

3 1:atuee

and Destiny of Man, I (New York,

19a1),

pp.
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Their lack of identification with romanticism may be due to
their dialectical fraeework.

This framework which separates them is,

nonetheless, rooted in romanticism as Tillich indicates when he dis•4
cusses the nature of the existential thinker.
The Existential thin=:er seeks special forms of exnression because
personal existence cannot be expressed in terms of objective experience. So Sol:ening uses the tradlticnal religious symbols,
Kierkegaard uses paradox, irony, and the pseudonym, Nietzche the
oracle, Bergson imares and fluid concepts, Heidegrer a mixture of
psychological and ontological terms, Jaspers uses what he calls
"ciphers," and the Religious Socialists use concepts oscillating
between immanence and transcendence. They all wrestle with the
problem of personal or non-objective thinking an4 its experiences.
This is the cellamity of the I.:xistential thinker.'

Like Schelling, Tillich uses religiour symbols.

If we look

at his view of religious language and compare it to the criticism
offered by the Idealist Brand Blanshard, we can more easily grasp
the relationship to romanticise.
Tillich describes the nature of religious language.
Religious symbols need no justification if their meaning is understood. For their meaning is that they are the language of religion
and the only way in which religion can exnress itself directly. Indirectly, and reflectively religion can also express itself in theological, philosophical, and artistic terms. But its direct self expression is the symbol and the united group of symbols which we call
myths,2
Religious symbolism is then divided by Tillich into primary
and secondary kinds.

3

The primary "point directly to the referent"

although it remains to be seen what the referent is.

This pointing

language includes symbols as attributes of the highest beings divine
1

Theolory of Culture, p. 91.

2 "ae !‘:eaninv. and Justification of Religious Symbols," in
Sidney Hook ed., Reliricus Lanruaee and Truth, (New York, 1961), p.

3

Ibid., p. 8.

3.

Cr)

actions, and divine incarnations
.
Secondary are supporting symbol
s, like water, light, oil, or
poetic symbols in which a primary
religious symbol is artistically
resymbolized, or metaphoric expres
sions as they appear in parables
or are used in poetry.1
When Elanshard examines the ful
l range of Tillich's discussion
of religious symbolisn, he con
cludes that the theologian is usi
ng sym2
bol in two different sense -.
On the one hand it is a pointer as
it
directs our thinking to somethin
g which is beyond our comprehensio
n.
But, on the other hand, symbol is
also expressive of a state of
mind.
To Blanchard, this dual functi
on of symbolism places any discussio
n of it
into a realm so broad and vagu
e that nothing profitable could fol
low.
Blanshard's major criticism, howeve
r, is his conviction that
Tillich is basically a rationali
st. Blanchard cannot perceive wha
t the
value of symbolism is and what
the significant difference betwee
n him and
Tillich is. After all, he say
s, what is the difference betwee
n someone
who guides his life by rea
son without revelation and someon
e who guides
his life by revelation but appeal
s to reason as his criterien for
the
selection of that revelation? Beca
use he can see no difference,
Elanshard
accuses Tillich of raticnalism.
This is not a fatal criticism
of Tillich's position of the exi
stential use of symbolism. It
is true that Tillich is in the
rationalistic
tradition even though his theolo
gy is a reaction to the older
neo-Kantian
liberalism. The rationalism he sha
res with Blanshard, however, is
their
common stance in the post-Enlig
htenment period. The romantics,
for example,
1
2

Ibid., p. 8.
"Symbols stn," in !ieligiour Lanreare
end Truth, pp. 50-51.

3 Ibid., p. 54.
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would not have cchsidered themselves "rationalists," but they did not
return to supernaturalism because of their acceptance of Enlightenment
principles.

Just as they were Enlightened romantics, so Blanshard is

an Enlightened idealist, and Tillich is an Trilightened existentialist.
The difference which Blanshard did not perceive in his article is the
shift in the nature of the transcendent which existentialism intro1
duced.
The difference between the rationalism of idealism and existentialism is brought out by Robert Ynudsen.
The ordinary, rationalistic idea of myth is that it is a relic of
pre-scientific understandine, which has been replaced by the responsible disciplines of science and philosophy. To the rationalist everything not verifiahle in terms of scientific technique or
amenable to reason is the result of feeling or fantasy and is mere
poetic expression, inadmissible as knowledge...If genuine meaning
is found in myth, the rationalist holds that this meaning is arenable to rational statement, which can supplant the mythical form
in which it has been transplanted.
This idea of myth which the thinkers we are studying ErirIch,
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Berdyaevj hold to be a product of the Enlightenment, is neither the "classic" view of myth as represerted
by Plato, nor the view held by many modern thinkers...According to
them [Tillich, Niebuhr, and Berdyaevi, the source, the depths, the
end, and therefore the unity of being cannot be grasped by reason
and exmressed in rational terms. These can only be exeressed in
the imaginative form of mythical thinking.2
As Bultmann follows this existential shift in the meaning of
transcendence, he is the apnarent synthesis of supernaturalism and
rationalism which Strauss tried to accomplish.

2.

The Text

With 3ultmann, the loci approach was abandened completely as a
structure for exegesis.

Full attention was eivcr to the new philology

1

Robert Knudsen, "Bultmann," in P.F. Hughes ed., Creative
Minds in Contennorerv Theolorv, (rand Ranids, 1966), p. 137.
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2

Symbc, and Myth," (Master's thesis, Library School, Union
Theological Seminary, 1952), pp. 15-16.

Historical criticism indicated that ther
e was no need to discover
eyewitness or apostolic authors tor the
text.

Rather, the problem of

origin could be pushed back behind what
was written to the flexibility
of the oral tradition.

Applying the latest developments in Old
Test-

ament research with Formgeschichte,
Bultmann was able to utilize a
fully immanent hermeneutical program.

He used this "literary-his-

torical" method in order to overcome the
dilemma of ethics and escha1
toiogy introduced by Schweitzer and
Wrede.
After discussing initial attempts to go
beyond the source
theory, Bultmann says:
It is at this point that we hope by
means of the form-historical
approach to make some further progress
. This begins with the observation that, especially in primitive lite
rature, literary expression (oral or written) makes use of
more or less fixed forms,
which have their own laws of style.
In the Old Testament we hPve
long been accustomed to recognize this
feature and to apply t_a
form-historical method. The forms
of psalm, prayer, prophetic
address, fable, story, and historical
narrative have been recognized and their stylistic laws have
been described. Is it pogsible
to identify similar literary forms
in the Synoptic tradition?'
A completely new view of the whol
e text could be presented.
It was no longer essential to a prog
ram of ethics to strain at the
sources in order to produce a hist
orical Jesus as exemplar. Bultmann
could even agree with Schweitzer that
the synoptic texts and the theology of Paul were rooted in an esch
atological theology of cosmic, physical redemption. Rid of dogmatic inte
rest, Bultnarn could carry out
a program of reconstructing New Test
ament Theology.
1
"The Study of the Synoptic Gospels" in Rudo
lf Bult11n and
Karl Kundsin, Form Criticism, (New York
, Harper Torchbook edition, 1934)
pp. 11f.
2
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
to Gosnel, (1919).

See also Yartin Dibelius, From Tradition
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In so far as Bultmann stands in tJ,,e post-tThlightenment tradition,
he assumes a Fat between the text and the interpreter.

The historical.

criticalmethod arpears to operate neeatively as it also yields gaps
between the historical Jeses (if env) and the text.

Then too, within

the text, we find different interpretations of Jesus.

The reader is

isolated from the text and the text is isolated from Jesus.

We do not

agree with the text and the textual writers do net egree with each
1
other.
As Bultmann applies the historical method, the result seems to
diversity.

There is a positive side, however, where the diverse

pieces of biblical criticism are brought together using the philosophical framework of Feidegeer's exietentialism.

Abandoning the program

of the older liberalism, Pultmann's affinity is not with the historical
Jesus but with the text as the interpretation

or

Jesus.

As applications

of the historical method seem to nesh the historical Jesus further away
from our grasp, Bultmann is not alarmed.

The iwporterce lies not in

the event itself but in the interpretation of the eve-4—
The link between, biblical vriters and modern ran is in the new
view of symbolism which grew from the romantic function

or

poetry.

Modern man as symbolizer understands -th:e prinitive as myth maker.

3. .'he Writer
Dialectical theology can use the romantic syebolism but with An
important difference.

Schleiermacher's divination was rooted in re-

liFicus Experience as he soueht the noueenal realm which had been
1
PP. 237f.

Rudolf Bultmarn, New Tertamert Theeloev, New York, 1955),

cicsed by the Kantian Philosothy.
kind of approach "symmetrical."

Morse Peckham has called this

One starts, as Kant did, with the

self as the creator of an instrument which will penetrate to the
noumena.

One assumes there is value in the noumenal realm to be

gained by analogy to the self.
Romantic thought took a turn, according to Peckham, to an
2
"asymmetrical" position as represented by Thomas Carlyle. The self
was then the only thing of value.
meandng on the world.

It had to impose its value and

Poetry was the instrument of this effort.

Instead of finding the noumenal realm, poetry became the noumenal
realm in itself.
Without the existential framework, it appears that Bultmann
would have been forced into cne of these positions.

(Perhaps Karl

Barth is to be understood with Carlyle when the recorcilinr work of
Christ alone has significance.
historically relativized.

God is anthropomorphized and man is

In this way we could understand Bultmann's

3
criticism that Barth tries to retain myth with demythologizing. )
Having rejected neo-Kantian liberalism, Bultrann is not seeking the
transcendent noumena.

Havirg rejected Barth, he is not seekIng an

autonomous mythology of the Christ.

His work includes a positive pro-

1
See Rudolf Ott, "1--e Idea of the Holy, 2nd ed. (New York,
1958), pp. 145-50.
2
Peckham, n. 186.

3
p. 29.

Robinson, "Hermereutics Since Barth," in The New Fermeneutle,

I
gram for explicating the biblical symbolism or demythologizing it.
The question will re, can a way be found to unlock the meaning of
symbolism and explain it eithout returning to the older liberalism?
John Macquarrie reminds us of the nature of mythology when he
seeks to explain the "disclosure of being" without reference to a
metaphysical nounenal realm.
They are not, that is to say, mythological symbols intended to
teach a philosophy of cosmic origins or a theistic world-view.
Their teaching goes far beyond any metaphysical doctrine of a First
Cause, which like science, would belong to the sphere of theoretical
understanding. The biblical accounts of the creation are to be
understood existentially. They are vehicles for the communication
of the existential understanding of the living God - saving knowledge of God, if we eay so sneak - which belonged to the sacred
writers and was disclosed or revealed to them in the exnerience of
faith. 2

This interpretation of methology cannot appeal to the Idealism
of the older liberalism not to the Realism of a scientific understandins.

On the one hand, there is the realm of timeless rrincirles or

eternal truths. If we internreted Jesus in terms of these principles,

3
we would lose his individuality as a "once for

hi event."

On the other

hand, there is the level of ordinary history where individual facts are
studied in terms of pure objectivity.
in achieving the true selfhood of man.

Both approaches are said to fail
They both anproach the event

1

"New Testament and Mythology," in Hans Pierner Bartech od.,
Kerygma and Meth, (New York: Harper Torchbook edition, 1953), P. 3:
"v:e ere therefore bound to ask whether, when we preach the Gospel today,
we expect our converts to accept not only the Gospel eessage, but also
the mythical view of the world in which it is set. If not, does the
New Testament embedy a truth which is quite indenendent of its mythical
setting? If it does, theoloev must undertake tt
,
3 task ef strirpinp the
Kerygma from its mythical framework, of "demythologizing it."
2

An Exishf -tielist 7heeloeY, (Few York, 1955), p. 64.
Robert Knudsen, "Pulteann," pp. 139f.

r4

from the standpoint of generality.
Reversing the distinction made by Martin Kahler between the
Jesus of the histcrian's methodolc77 and the Jesus of the Gospel his1
tory, Bultmann says that the Jesus of the Gospels is unreliable.
Kahler had said the Jesus of the historian was unreliable.

For Bult-

mann, Gospel history gives us not ordinary time (Realism) nor timeless
truths (idealism) hut "decision time."

Man is faced with the alternative

of his natural existence in "sin" or an openness to the future possibility of his true self in "salvation."
to the church in preaching.

These alternatives are presented

Here the recurring, paradoxical contem-

poraneity of Christ's death and resurrection are presented.

The death

and the resurrection are a blending of the historical and the non-hisTor-,ether they form the husk which must be separated from the
2
truth.
The biblical writer
existential
or
decision
kernel meaning of

torical.

and interpreter meet in their common concern for self-understanding.
Bultmann has been opposed by orthodoxy over tne origin and
application of myth to Jesus.

The snan of time available appears to be

so short as to make a mythological association with Jesus improbable.
Perhans a nore telling criticism is one which comes from within
existential nhilosophy itself. In a written dialogue with Bultmann, Karl
Jaspers correctly, we think, draws the options between orthodoxy and

3
"liberalism."

Jacpers's own position is that mythology is irredncibie.

1 George Ladd, "The Search for Perspective," Interpretation,
XXV (January, 1971), pp. 51f.
2 Bultnan, "New Testaent Mythology," pp. 8f.

3 "Myth and Religion," in Karl Jar -.ors and P.dolf Bultmann,
M-fth and Christianity, (sew York, 1958), p. 37.

his view sounds familiar as he says
,
The nYth tells a story and expresses
intuitive insights rather
than universal concents. The myth is
historical, both in the form
of its thinkinn and in its content.
It is not a cloak or disguise
put over a general idea, which can be
better and more directly
grasped intellectually...The myth is a
carrier of meanings which
can be exnresspd only in the languare
of m7th. The mythical figures
are svmbols which, by their very natu
re, are untranslatable into
other language.1

In so far then as Bultmann seeks to translat
e the language of
myth into rational language, jaspers
charges that he has either returned to liberalism or to orthodoxy.

We could interpret Jaspers as

saying that Bultmann has not accomplished
a synthesis or escaned the
dilemma which Strauss strurgled to over
come with his own view of mythology. According to Jaspers, Beltmann
"has not discovered A ni.1.7 'orm for
the language of faith, although he
thinks that his exst,ntialist inter2
pretation provides a new method for the
true accuisition of faith.'
The heart of Jasners's criticism stem
s from his own stance within
existentialism. Bultmann has sought an
immanent interpretation through
the means of Heidegger's philosonhy.
;41.1ereas Heidegger does not develop a Christian approach, Bultmann offe
rs a ccunter claim by introducing
divine revelation.
Surely, we recornize the dogmatic tore
of Jaspers's criticism

3

(as did Bultmann)

but V-.e point remains.

Having taken his stance in

an immanent interpretation, Palt
mann fails to work adecuately with his
position. "Occasionally he seems to
be giving a n,-e form to t'7.e old
1
2

Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
Ibid., p. 49.

3 "The
57f.

Case for r)emv-tholceizing," in Yyth and
Christianity,

PP.
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1
theological rationa1is7., ; at other times, to be re-founding orthodoxy."
That orthodoxy, Jaspers sees as the Fauline-Lutheran doctrine of radical sinfulness. Bultmann holds it as a universal judr.lent about all
2
men and Jaspers simply disagrees.
If Jaspe.rs is rignt, does it mean that the view of imagination
which seems to do justice to the writer of the text cannot be "explicated" and reduced?
in their poetry?

Must it stand, as the romantics themselves used it

?Alt if the symbols are irreducible, then where is the

communication of these symbols to the world?
It appears as if the options are these:

1) return to so7e form

of liberalism with the classicism that roes with it, 2) leave the symbols
untouched and therefore irrelevant to modern man, or 3) penetrate deeper
into a dialectical interpretation such as the "lingual event" of the
post-Bultmannian New Hermeneeutie.
1
2

4 •

*Myth and Religion," p. 110.
Ibid., p. 50.

III.

A.

THE NEV HUMANITIES

The New Hermeneutic

1.

The interpreter

If we say that gaining models for the literary structure of the
biblical text and the imagination of the writer has failed in the past,
and if we feel an appropriate pessimism about the future of such programs, then perhaps we shall explore the alternative.

Instead of de-

rivin7 our models and methods from the literature of the humanities,
why not draw them from the biblical text itself?

Assuming for the

moment that such a statement makes sense, our need for common principles
would mean that the humanities wruld have to be interpreted as Scripture
is interpreted.
The New Hermeneutic of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling represents
one attempt at making this alternative intelligible.

For them, however,

it does not mean that philological methodologies are drawn from the biblical, text and then applied to other areas. Immanent methods will contime to be applied to the Bible in an effort to disclose the human
origin and connection of its ideas.

Instead, their work will involve

a reinterpretation of the humanities from the standpoint of the biblical
1
idea of transcendence.
1

James M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," in The New
hermeneutic, D. 69: "Ore of the most significant asnects of this new
theology is that it stands within the context of a new assessment of
the nature of the liberal arts in peneral." Rebirson points to i;ans
Jonas and Hans-Georg Gadamer as forerunners of this new orientation for
the hnranAties.

6o
There is a definite sense in which we may speak of the post1
Eeiltmannian period.
The Few Ferneneutic is located in this period
but is a continuation of Bultmann's dialectical program.

The nature

of the transcendent is borrowed from the existential philosophy of the
2
so-called "Later Heidegger."
We way well ask ourselves in what sense is this a reinterpretaion of the humanities if the historical method remains the same and
the very definition of the transcendent is but an attempted perfection
of the 3ultmannian -tace?

The answer probably lies in the nature of

the "general hermeneutic" they are seeking.

It is an attempt to provide

a comprehensive method for both theology and the humanities as an implication fren the dialectical position.

Haw can we argue, for instance,

that Scrinture is to be interpreted existentially and yet the literature
of the other humanities is not treated in the saee way?

Why do we limit

ourselves to the New Testament for cur hermeneutical exercises?

No

special place can be given the Bible without at once reirtroducing a
dorr,matic program on the part of the interpreter.
The suggestion is then made that both biblical literature and
the literature of philosophy, history, and the arts rust be grasped
3
existentially.
If the humanities need an existential reinterpretaticn,
does this mean that all non-scientific literature necessarily becomes
"revelatory" or "disclosures of being?"
1

Robinson, The New quest of the Historical Jesus, pp. 10f.

2
See Robinson's essay "The German Piscussion of the Later
heidegger," in James M. Robinson and John 9. Cobb Jr., ed., The Later
Feideeeer and Theolorr, (New York, 1963), pp. 3-76.
- Robinson, "Hereeneutic Since Barth," pp. 69f.
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The New Hermeneutic is movinr
in a direction prepared for
it by
the history of biblical stu
dies. Something apparently
has to give way.
But as we have mapped
out this survey, the problem
has not been primarily
1
one of "hermeneutic" but
rather "herneneutics."
The very point we have
singled out as the problem
area, viz., the assumed sim
ilarity between
the biblical text and the hum
anities, is presupposed by
the New Hermeneutic. The difficulties
which result from this presup
nosition are then
resolved in terms of the tra
nscendeet and not the imm
anent.
Originally, according to Jam
es M. Robinson, "hermeneutics"
had
2
three different senses.
It could mean the language or
speech itself,
a translation of tha
t language into another langea
re, or a commentary
on that language. The
reason for "hermeneutics" aro
se from needed
clarification in normal commun
ications and the need to sol
ve rrcblees
in authoritative litera
tures. The three thinrs "he
rneneutics" dealt
with were the language
of the text, the historical
setting in order to
understand the original mea
ning, and a literary analys
is of rhetoric
3
or style.
With the rise of the histcrica
l method, liberalism became
critical and orthodoxy con
tinued the stylistic ana
lysis.
The first move to the Ncrw
Hermeneutic came early in the
twentieth century with the dis
tinction between "explanat
ion" and "understanding."
Traditional hermeneutics cou
ld arrive at the explanati
on
of the text, but to und
erstand it was an epistemol
ogical problem.
1
Hermeneutic refers to unders
tanding and hermeneutics
to explanation.
rerers
2 Ibid., pp. 6f.
1
- Ibid., pp. 12f.
4
Ibid., pp. 19f.
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n
Using Wilhelm Dilthey's notion of Verstehen, the general questio was
posed, "haw is understanding possible?"
The debate between Karl Earth and Adolf Harnack was an early
1
As a neo-Kantian liberal, Harnack held that
.
example of the problem
ve
the language of biblical mythology or symbolism indicated the defecti
2
Barth, on the other hand,
cate.
communi
to
ability
nature of language's
that
initiated the contemporary discussions of interpretation by denying
defectiveness.

When Bultmann made use of Dilthey's distinction between

explanation and understanding in his prograe of demythologizing (or
e.
"content criticism") he was assuming the defective character of larguag
It is in this sense that Bultmann could be accused of never having fully
left the older liberal tradition.
The Yew Fereeneutic wants to focus attention en the very nature
of language itself, and overcome the defective assunpticn.

The problem

then is not with the mythological lanruage only, but vith all language.
Meaning in objectified forms tends to lead away from itself. Thus,
preBultmann's hermeneutic lead away from the language of myth to the
3
There was an inherent tension in his deunderstandinz of the writer.
mythologizing program.

When Bultmann say's, "Myth is not intended to be

interpreted cosmologically, but rather anthropologically, or better
4
still, existentially," the very forms which this existential understanding take, lead the reader away from the existential to the objectified
1

Ibid., pp. 25f.

2

Ibid., pp. 311. :arl F.Prth acknowledgoe the "inadequacy" of
language but not its "defectiveness."
*;

4

3

7' 4 rl

p. 37.

4 "wew Testaeent Yvtholo7y," n. /2.
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cosnological form.

7or example, when tbe wri
ters s.y t‘7e.t. Jesus was
resurrected form the dea
d, Pultmann interprets thi
s as languaFe about
the internal renewal
of the writers themselve
s. Put by objectifyinr
the meaning in myth, the
y lead the reader away fro
' the subjective
motivation to the object
ive form of physical res
urrection in timespace.
The New Hermeneutic, the
refore, wants to begin
1.-ith this inherent problen of symbcl
ism. A philosophical str
ucture was provided by
the thought of the Lat
er Heidegeer.
Bultmann was concerned
with myth and the existenti
al self understanding. This self und
erstanding was the "pre-un
derstanding" which
had to be subordinated
as the text was interpret
ed. Fuchs and Fbeline,
however, are concerned
1
with language itself as the
subject matter.
Self understanding is
the Foal of the interpret
ation for as we interpret the text, the tex
t interprets our self
understanding. The text
interprets itself by wha
t it has to say about
us. The focal point is
not explanation or und
erstendieF. It is langua
re itself. Language
speaks.
3ultmann's kervgma is dronpe
d as introducing a sen
aration
between Jesus' word and
the word of the church.
We cannot dismiss
the historical Jesus and
His spoken word without
a loss to the very
center of the Christian
rsith itself. The way in
which the historice1
Jesus is retained withou
t returnin7 to the older
liberalism and its
classicism is through the
dialectical °language eve
nt." Jesus' word
and the word of the chu
rch belong torether. The
re is meaning in the
1 Faobinson, "Herroneutic
Since Rarth," p. 63.
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recurring event of language itself.

Theology is "hermeneutic" as it

translates what the Bible has to say into the word for
today.
Hence, the text is there for the sake of the event of inter
pretation, whfch is the text's origin and future. For the
word thet
once happened and in happening became the text must again
become
word with the help of the text and thus happen as interp
reting
word. What happens in the word event can thus be
called interpretation, since it is the essence of the word to clarify
what is
obscure, to bring light into darkness, and ttus, if
it is the word
that concerns every man absolutely, to name tie reali
ty of man's
being as what it truly is.1
The difference between this post-Bultmannian program
of "hermeneutic" and the traditional attempts at "hermeneut
ics" is brought out
by Oscar Ceilnann's idea of an interpretive
program.
first, before all evaluation, all judging, perhaps even
prior to
all "being addressed" in my "understanding of exist
ence," prior to
all believing, simply to be obedient to what
the men of the new
covenant want to connunicate to me as revelation
, even if it is
Quite foreign to me. I am aware that I thereby stand
in conteadiction to a "hermeneutical" trend widely prevalent
today.2
Robinson feels that Cullmann has not adequately respon
ded to
the Bultmanniae tradition for Bultmann too was inter
ested in this des-

3

crirtve level.

For BUltmann, however, it was rot enough.

A positive

program of reinterpretation was needed to make
the text relevant..
The New Hermeneutic has seen that the humanities canno
t be separated from the interpretation of biblical liter
ature for interpretation
takes its stance within the humanities.

Bet we would hold their solution

of an existential re-evaluation fails to meet the cente
r of the problem.
Traditional hermeneutics and Cullmann's position
my fall short in
1 Ibid., p. 68.
2

Ibid., r. 41. Ro'iinsonle translation is more "existenti
al"
than Floyd Filson's. Cf. Christ and Time, (Philadelphia, Pevise
d vdition,
196:4), p. 14.

3 Robinson,
"Hereeneetic Since Rarth," p. 6(s.
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grasping the meaning of the text or descr
ibinr the tort, but the prob1em
is not that hermeneutics does not ro far
enough in its program. The
problem is that it goes too far.

The New Hermeneutic has not dealt with

the central problem.
One even senses a frustration in Fuchs and
17belinr over the ability to reproduce the biblical contents
.

Py taking our stance in the post-

Enlightenment rationalism, we are const
antly reminded of our differences
with the biblical writers.

The method of the New Hermeneutic in effe
ct

offers a way for the reader to skip
over the problematic natare of the
biblical contents. When Fuchs tells of
the early influences in his
thought, he remebers a professor whcse inter
pretation of John's Gospel
was filled with his own personal exnerien
ces.
Schlatter interacted with
the text and introduced his own ideas by
way of exposition.

A detailed

descriptive method is unnecessary, for
the stance of the interpreter is
always presnt. The interpretation
of the text becomes a dialorue between cultural contexts.
It is no wonder that the primary concern
of Fuchs and 7beling is
2
systematic theology and not biblical theo
logy.
In systematics, the
church is seeking to communicate its mes:age to the world.

Such communi-

cation is made possible by the common
rround a "FPneral hermeneutic" provides to all the humanities.
1 "The
New Testamf,mt and the Hermereutical Problem,
" in The New
Hermeneutic, pp. llf.
2,
nobinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," p. A.

2.

The Taxt

Norman Prrrin says that Fuchs
is more a mystic than he is
an
1
exegete.
Trying to understand him is imp
ossible. But Perrin notes
there is a clarifying voice on
the scene in the person of Amo
s Wilder.
In fact, growing out of the
New Hermeneutic and the New
Quest of the
historical Jesus, an aaorroach
to the Gospel parables has bee
n developed
by Wilder, Robert Funk, and
Dan C. Via, Jr. Wilder had arn
arently
initiated a new course for par
able studies when in 1964 he
wrote The
Language, of the Gospel: Earl
y, Christian Rhetoric. Thi
s book has introduced into the exegetical wor
ld a direct relationship bet
ween biblical
criticism and literary critic
ism.
At first, this appears to be
nothing new if we are thinking tha
t
literary criticism is literary
analysis. The use of figures of
aneech
be/onas to the traditional pro
gram of hermeneutics. Rut whe
n we notice
that Amos Wilder's brother is
the famed author of Our Town,
Thornton
2
Wilder, then we will be sen
sitive to the new direction
criticism is
taking. Literary criticism
is becoming not only textual
analysis, but
artistic analysis.
In the hands of Len Via, the
parables are divided into the
comic
3
and the tragic.
They are understood through
the application of principles used to penetrate the
meaning of art objects. The
parables are
studied for their "creative
literary art" and "the effect
iveness of
1

Forman Perrin, "The Mon'ern Int
erpretation of the Parables
Jesus and the Problem of
of
Hermeneutic," Interrretation,
XXV
(Ap
ril
,
197
1),
P. 135.
2

Amos Wilder, "The Word as Add
rrss and 'caning," in The rew
wermenrutic, p. 203.
1 Perrin, p. 142.
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1
that artistry."

The parable of the Unjust Steward is trea
ted as

2
"a miniature of what has cone to be
known as the picaresque mode."
This approach can be seen as an outgrowt
h of the New Hermeneutic for it sees the parables apart
from their historical context
and treats them as artistic objects.
It is in this sense that the
existential understanding of Fuchs
can be understood.

Now we know

what it means for languare itself to
speak to the reader.
The historical-critical method is assumed,
says Perrin, but it
may not always be relevant.
It may be true, for example, that many of
the parables of Jesus
were originally weapens of controve
rsy directed against, groups of
opponents as Jeremias has claimed. But
does that mean that they
must always be interpreted in that particul
ar historical context?
The answer this time ls in the negative
; but then at this point we
have reached a limit of historical crit
icism by observing that an
aesthetic object created in one situ
ation for one purpose can take
on a life and vitality of its own as
it moves into other siteations,
and this is certainly true of the para
bles of jesus.3
On the basis of this approach, the
parables of Jesus are treated

4

in the same way one treats Waiting
for Godot.

The once mystical under-

standing of Fuchs now beeOmes the inte
rpretation every reader of the
novel can appreciate. Jesus is impa
rting to his followers "his vision
...by the power of metaphor...."

6

5

Both Perrin and Robinson see this new
twist as a neo-liberal-

Ism.

Perrin, p.
2

Perrin, p. 143.
Perrin, p.
Perrin, p. 143.

5
6

Perrin, p. 144.
Perrir, p. 146.
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74. The Writer
Amos

is not ready, however, to accent the existential

framework of Fuchs and Ebeling.

Located in the American tradition of

empiricism, he feels existentialism centers too much on Man as Will
1
and ignores the meaningful content of what is communicated.
Man,
2
he claims, is noetic as well as conative.
Instead of existential
symbolism, Wilder prefers to follow the lead of symbolic studies made
by Cassirir, Langer, and others by placing man within a cultural con4
3
text.
The term he uses in this connection is "creation."

B.

The Hermeneutical Situation of Twentieth Century Orthodoxy

1.

The Interpreter

The reason Oscar Cullman has di.sagreed with Bultmann does not
lie soley in an academic and theoretical difference over exegetical

f

procedures.

Cullmann feels that Bultmarn has not understood tl-:e text

to which he is trying to existentially relate.

The existentialist,

he charges, has not seen that eschatological history is indisuensible
to understanding the New Testament mind.

When Bultmenn purports to

remove the so-called "kernal" of eschatology, Cullmann feels he hes not
kept dogmatic interests separate from exegetical studies.
one of Schweitzer's criticism.

1 :Alder, p. 204.
2 Wilder, p. 202.

3
4

Wilder, p. 216.
Wilder, p. 217.

This reminds
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Cullmann says:
Modern Protestant Theology has a tendency
to bring together the
New Testament scholar and the dogmatic theo
logian. This haPpened
in the existentially ordented exegesis.
Indeed, a more active conversation between them is salutary. But
I find the manner of amalgamating them on the basis of a certain "her
meneutics" dangerous
for exegesis...In this connection I woul
d like to refer to the
acceptance of CHRIST AND TIME on the part
of "nontheologiens," such
as historians, philosophers, etc. I foun
d already in connection
with my other books that such scholars are
apparently more ready to
accept the seemingly strange aspects of
revelation than many theologians; they are readier to ccnsiHer the
texts without immediately
rejecting the "strange."'
Can we say that Cullmann has approached
the text as a historian?
How would this be possible in ligh
t of the accusation we have made about
the source of interpretive models? Woul
d this not
an that Callmann
has borrowed principles from the supposed
ly neutral humanity of history
and imnosed them on the text?
This has the narks of a strawman.
Schweitzer's lead.

Cullmann is seeking to follow

His work does not reflect on hypotheses for
the or-

igins of biblical ideas buk rather seeks to expl
ain the connection of
ideas.

These ideas find their coherence not in term
s of a super-

Imposed logical model but rather from
a historical or eschatological
structure.

Cullmann knows this the same way Schweitzer knew
it.
2
looked at the text.
When Cullmann warns theologians to withhold
their do

ge

tie

evaluations until the text is explaine
d, he is pleading for a neutral
or descriptive method which must come
first. We mirht say that before
1
2

Christ and Time, p. 13.

Such a resporse is not as ridiculous as
it first sees when
we remember Schweitzer's report that
Gunkel was the first one to closely
examine the actual text to see Faul
's usage of the term "spirit."
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one can tell whether or not he agrees or disagrees with the text, one
must *Know what the text is saying.

The fact that "nontheologians" appar-

ently agree with this approach means Cullmann has found acceptance in the
humanities.

What the humanities will do with his work, however, is an-

other ouestion.
Our concern is whether Cullmann's descriptive method can, in fact,
renroduce the contents of the biblical literature in a thorough going
fashion.

It may be the case that Cullmann becomes limited in the same

way Schweitzer was.

Seeing many things clearly about the text, they,

nevertheless, do not share the world view of the biblical writers as an
interpretive principle.

This may lead then away from the central thrust

of the New Testament theology.
Perhaps the very goal "'New Testament theology"

is

the problem.

Perhaps, a new leveling process has begun by using the diversity of the
writers to the extent that each produces his own theology.

Dogmatic

theology is then seen as the encompassing view point of unity which
relates the material.
If we seek to fully take our stance in a descriptive method fres
of evaluation, and apply the methods of criticism, will we be driven to
posit the unity of the New Testament literature?

According to the New

Hermeneutic, the unity comes from dogmatic interest.

Once we have

abandoned the doctrine of divine origin through sinsniration" is Vier*
a need to seek New Testament unity in exegesis?
Cullmann has said that the unity vas in terns of a comnon view
of history as eschatological.
eneugh.

ile this is true, it does not go far

It may be that there are other themes under which the hIstoricol

is to be subsumed.
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We will surest below tha
t the unity of a New Testam
ent theology
which will influence our
methods of interpretation, wil
l be rooted in
Pauline theology as the
1
"systematic theology" of the
New Testament. If
so, then we will have to
alter our traditional unders
tanding of dogmatics
at this point. Paul
as theologians will mean tha
t the theology of the
church should find its
structure and the structure
for New Testament
thought in his work. It
means that the other writer
s of the New Testament both feed into his
system as contributers and
help Provide elaborations of his thought.
The way this unity can be
mantained ie through return
ing to a
presurpositional stance
of unity through the Spirated
origin of the text.
It will mean the end of "le
veling" the text and it wil
l moan a union of
church theolovy and biblic
al theology.
In addition to Paul as theolo
gian, we will wart to poi
nt to the
controlling motifs in his
thought. Eschatological his
tory is the structure for the work of Chr
ist, but Paul does not sto
p there. Fe places this
history within his most
inclusive category, viz.,
creation.
If the interpreter assumed
this same stance within cre
ation, the
text could still be interp
reted as other documents;
but instead of taking
the models from classical
literature, they would oom
e from the Bible.
In other words, our ration
alistic orientation shapes
out philosophies of
history and methods of
Philology with a supposed
universality to them.
This is not a creational
approach and will not see
k to capture, for
example, Paul's view of
history. This does not mea
n the oft repeated
1

For a full elaboration of
this position, see Richard fla
review article on Herman
ffin's
Ridderbos' :maulus in "l'aul
as Theologian," The
Westminster Theological
Journal, me7wi77; 1968),
pp. 2o4-12.
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eschaeological nature of history only.

In our parlance today, we

would need Paul's view of "event" itself.

Whether or not Paul's view

of historical events should be normative for all historical interpretation cannot be answered here.

We may only note the difficulty in

using non-creationally based methods to understand the works of one
who believes in creation.

We may find ourselves, as Cullmann was

suggesting, treating something in the text as metanherical.

If we

look for the "higher" or "deeper" meanings behind the metaphor, we
may then have shafted the understanding of the writer.
The New hermeneutic has indicated the need for a new understanding of the humanities.

But instead of interpreting them existen-

tially, the biblical exegete should place this one context within the
broader creational context.

However, Langdon Gilkey gives us a s-nple

of the modern view of creation.
In Chapter 2 we said that the idea of createon was a "religious
rather than a scientific or metaphysical idea, because it provided an answer to one of the fundamental religious questinns of
en's life, namely, the question of the ultimate meaning of his
life as a contingent, temporal being set in the wider context of
nature and of history.'

2.

The Text

Calvin already knew what Schweitzer is given credit for having
discovered, viz., thet redemption in the hew Testament hes a creational
setting.

It has cosmic significance.

It is objective.

not a metaphor projected from within a naturalism.

Creation is

The "fall" into

sin and the curse of the ground are coseic, so ccsmic that redemetion
1 1.4leer
•
of

oeven and Trarth, (New York, 1959), p. 79.
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too must have a physical an-i objective
side in the resurrection of
the body and the restoration of the Froan
ina creation itself.
If we use the distinction between naturalism
and superrpturalism within the Christian circles, we shoul
d not define the naturalism
after the fashion of Deism and then posit
supernaturalism as the divine
intervention into the law structure.

Rather, we should do what Paul

does and speak of the one context of
creation which is cosmically
disturbed by sin.

Those after Adam form Paul's view of the
"natural."

They are the "earthy" who are without
the knowledge of God.
We can perhaps speak to the problem of repro
ducing the rew
Testanent theolory and this problem of super
naturalism if we look to
1 Corinthians 15: 44-45. Geerhardus Vos,
John Murray, Harry Baor, and
1
Richard Gaffin, have all worked on this
text in interesting ways. Why
they are FrouPed together lies in their herme
neutical principle of
creation.

Each develops the text in his own way.

The ultimate comparison Paul makes of Chri
st, outside his
Sonship, is the contrast with Adam.

In 1 Corinthians 15, that contrast

begins as the natural against the "spiritn
al" reminding us of 1 Corinthians 2.

But soon the contrast works itself not to nan
after the fall

into sin but to

an before that fall.

Adam as he is natural man by vir-

tue of his creation cut of the dust is
contrasted to Christ as Fe is the
1

Geerhardus Vos, :he Pauline EschAtcice7v, (Gra
nd Rapids, 1961).
This book was originally puhlished in 1930
but Vosis baslc idea on the
Spirit and Eschatolory can be traced
to his article "The lisschatological
Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the
Spirit," in Biblical and Theolorical Etudies, by nembers of the facul
ty at Princeton Theological Seminary, 79777 pp. 205-259. John Murr
ay, Princi-les of Christian Conduct, (Grand Rapids, 1957). Harry Baor
, Pentecost and the 7issicnary
'atness. A thorough discussion is f-v
on by Uchard
:,affin, Jr.,
"Resurrection and Redemption: A Stud
y in Pauline Soterioloav," (Doctoral dissertation, Library School,
Westnirster Theolof.cal Seminary, 1970),
pp. 104-130.
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'ran by virtl:o of His res=ectio

Sniri

As arirlst, in His reFur-

rpction, is created out of the heavenly substance,
Giving Spirit.

e becemes the Life-

Paul argues, as there is the one, so there is the other.

The natural/Spiritual is being pushed back to Paul's interpretation of
what we may call the original destiny of man.

Only Vos, to be followed

in elaboration by Gaffin, explores this strange ultimate comparison be1
tween the first man by creation and the last man by resurrection.
Here is a suggestion of what these men see.
creation.

Man was created whole and good.

The context is

Yet, as the traditional

formulations say, he was to be "confirmed in his righteousness."
the test of the tree of "the knowledge of Good and Evil."

IIence,

This theol-

ogical interpretation of the so-called confirmation in righteousness is
what Paul sees as the bestowal of the Spirit.
dwell on the earth of God's creation.

The Spiritual man was to

Adam was not to live his life as

only the man of creation but also the man of the Spirit. (Notice how
Abraham Kuyper finds it necessary to first deal with the creational
2
possibility of Adam's successful completion of the *probation.")
What characterizes this creational approach is the seriousness of
treating Adam and his race as a legitimate option in not sinning against
God.

The pre-fall state is considered normal and against this must be

contrasted the abnormal consequences which followad.

The significance of

what we are saying about haying to re-think our concertual framwork comes
with this distinction between the normal and the present abnormal condition.
For Paul, the creation is groaning for its redemption jest as the Jews or

- See the extended footnote in The Pauline 7:schatologv, 7.0. 169_

70.
2 p
rincinles of Seered ,Theoloao.:
., (Grand Raids, 1965), crl. 275f.
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1
Isrealites groaned for their redemption from
Egypt.

It is not charact-r-

istic of our present methodologies to theorize
on the basis of the abnormality of the cosmos.
Here we may allude to what we mean by Paul as syste
matic theologian.

The thrust of Paul's contrast in I Corinthians
15 between creation

and resurrection is that He became the
promise.
Spirit that He became the Snirit.

Christ so received the

Paul provides more explicit contexts for

our theological thought than the other write
rs; yet they describe the
same subject matter.

Peter's description of Christ inheriting the promi
se

of the Father is parallel to Paul's exege
sis of Genesis with Christ as the
2
Life-Giving Spirit.
Whereas Peter makes us think of a packaged prese
nt,
the "gift," Paul stresses the union of the
Spiritual blessing with the
Lord of the church.
Notice for instance haw Paul's mind works.

His mission is to

the Gentiles.

This has provided much speculation on the part
of theol-

ogians as to

synthesis in Paul's mind with the Greek rhilosophi
es of

the day.

2.

Baur, for instance, had contrasted Paul's Helle
nistic freedom

and universalism with that of Hebraic
legalism. It is assumed that Paul
as missionary to the Greeks must find
his roots for communication in tbm
Greek cultural ccntext which molds his
theology.
Instead, let us consider Paul's appeal to the
promise of Abraham
prior to the existence cf the line of Isrea
l as a supra-Hebraic reference
point.

Paul has found a Principle of faith which
rill include bcth the

subsequent Jews and the Gentiles.
1
2

Romans 8:22.
:cts 2:1,.

Fp one will disagree with us on this.
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The nature of his missio
nary activity demands that he app
eal to a context
which will include them bot
h. If God be one in methodology
for dealing
with mankind in the Jud
gment, then a common context is
needed.
But this need for a supra-Hebr
aic context does not end with
Abraham. It stretches back to
a creational context. Not able to
appeal directly to the Jewish law as
the standard of morality when
arguing with the
Gentiles, Paul appeals to
creation. Too often, studies
in Pauline theology have stopped short
of this reference point. It see
ms to critics to
be enourh to center on Pau
l and the Greeks without examin
ing his foundation. Paul's movement to
creation is demanded in order
to gain a
rspective by which to view all
men. He does not stop with Abr
aham, but
moves back to Adam to includ
e all men in sin. He is allowe
d to argue then,
in Romans 1, about the condit
ion of all men. The appeal to
the promise to
Abraham only covers the possib
ility of salvation to all.
A foundation is
needed to explain why man is
in need of such salvation.
Creation then
becomes his ultimate reference
point, exactly because he mus
t deal with
the Greeks. We have seen how
he pushes his thought back
behind the use of
Adam as the ground for sin
, to include Adam as the gro
und for the promise
which was extended to Abr
aham.
To dispense with creation as
a metaphor searchin7 to expres
s something other than its "objec
tification" is to lose the cosmic
and physical
view of salvation underlyin
g Pauline thought. Schweitze
r had pushed the
cosmic in the direction of the
Fnd Tines, but ignored its sig
nificance as
the very beginning of Paul's
Position. 1.-e are suggesting
that it is this
beginning which makes the apo
stle's thought cohere. Schwei
tzer, then,
did not provide for the ful
ness of Pauline perspective,
for he allowed
mysticism to bridge t,•e rap
between the apostle and the intern
reter, irre-
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gardless of their differing
interpretations on the nature
of the physical.
We may now offer a sugges
tion for the interpretation
of Pauline
theologff in particular.
The eschatological or histor
y of redemption
approach is not broad eno
ugh in its present form to und
erstand Paul if
It abstracts that histor
y from his view of creati
on.
Focus has been placed
on the death and reserrect
ion of Christ as
the model for the life of
the believer. As the believ
er stands between
the resurrection of Chr
ist and the resurrection
of the Church, his existence is controlled and
interpreted by his identific
ation with the death and
resurrection, and his dai
ly renewal. Culimann has
identified this as the
"already," and the "no
t yet." The believer has
forensically entered into
the union with the death
and resurrection of Christ
. He has been raised
with Christ and is justif
ied. Yet he is not righte
ous in the outer mrn so
he goes through the tra
nsformation process to com
pletion 2t the second comi
r.
Just as Paul uses this
model of the work of Christ
for interpreting the life of the believ
er, so he uses models to
interpret the work of
, 4
Christ. The chief modeis
e:re probably Moses, Abr
aham, and Adam, In His
death and resurrection
, these models converge to
produce an interpretati
on
which deals respectively
with a new law covenent,
the inheritance of the
promise, and a new cosmic
order of Spiritual existe
nce. None of which
can be separated from eac
h other far their common
denominator is the gift
or blessing of the Spi
rit in the resurrection
of Christ.
.he !-'osac context makes His
death necessary but it also
shapes
Paul's view of the resurr
ected Christ as a new law
giver, one who edninisters the Spiritual gifts
to His people. Likewise,
in His resurrection,
Christ is the Seed of Abr
aham in that He inherits
the promise to Abraham
of the Spirit which He adn
inisters as the new Mos
es.
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And again, in His resurrection, as He receives the promise of
the Father, He is constituted the new Adam.

He is the man composed out

of heavenly substance who inaurerates the new order of existence.

3.

The Writer

The problem of sneakinE about what is not in creation is a real
one.

But can we equate theological language proper with Christological

language?

Since the context is creation, Paul is able to speak of the

work of God, and God is able to reveal himself.

It does not follow from

the symbolic reference to the creator that therefore, the language Paul
or other writers use to describe the work of Christ is metaphorical or
symbolic in the same serse.

Languame about the resurrection from the

dead is not the same as language about what is beyond our experien
ce.
They do not have common roots in symbolic imagination.

Instead of re-

ferring to Paul as theologian, perhaps it would have been better referring to hie as historian.

He is not offering us a systematic theology,

In our modern use of the expression, on the nature of the ontological
trinity.

Rather, he is interpreting the historical event of the resur-

rection cf Christ as the initiation of the '
-7,r1.-! Tines.
The problem seems to reduce itself to this:

we do not agree with

Jesus and Paul and therefore, we cannot understand them.

Dur wend view

has established pigeon holes to deal with people who talk about the acts
of God and heavenly redeemers.
imagination or mytho1e7y.

Today, we sophisticatedly call it poettc

We then atply our methods of poetic analysis

in order to grasp what the text is saving.
Whoever wrote the text, hoeever, does not agree with us.

We say

"mythology," and develep a psychological framework by which we handle
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the text.

Ealt whoever is writing ind
icates that he is separatin
g himself
from the poetic imagination
we hare developed.
Second Peter 1:16 says tha
t they did not follow after
cunnungly
devised fables when they
made known the power and com
ing of the Lord, but
rather they were eyewit
nesses. It is no secret that thi
s letter has had
a difficult time with
critics on the question of can
onicity and date.
But the point remains tha
t the writer is separating
his position from
what we would call or lab
el a "creative imagination.
"
Acts 14, provides us with
another contrast. Again, the
date of
Acts is ouestioned, but aga
in the pcint is that "Luke" riv
es us a connarisonbetween the kind of men
tality described by "poetic
imaginaticn" and
the message which was being
preached cy the apostles. In ord
er to formulate a clear "theology of
Luken literature," on' must
take this into
consideration. Luke's theolo
gy does not appear to be rooted
in "religious experience." Not only
does the beginning of Acts
have a literal
interpretation of the works
of Christ issuing from Christ
himself, before
the so-called "karygnatic"
event of oreachina, but in
the 14th chapter
this message is contrasted to
paganism.
ahen the Greeka see something
they cannot understand, such
as the
miracle which Paul nerforms
on the lame man, they imm
ediately mythologize
and attribute it to the
incarnation of the pantheon.
Faut Paul gives then
a different account of the
7-Icarnation as rooted in
the creator cod.
How foolish, we eay say, tha
t Luke did not realize he was doi
ng
the sane thing. The incarnati
on of Luke's Christ was differ
ent from the
metaphorical interpretations
of the barbarians. Luke did
not believe he
was doing the same thing.
Arlie., in hark 9, after the
transfiguration of Christ, Jea
us

FO
tells His disciples ncit
to spread an account of wh:)
t they had seen until
after the Son of an be
risen from the dead. Having
been fed on a steady
diet of parables and cha
stized repeatedly f2r their
dullness in understanding, the disciples procee
ded to engage in a "literary
analysis" of the
symbol wli5ch had been use
d. What could it mean that
une be raised from
the dead? The point is
ironic. The writer of 11;:rk
is telling us that
the disciples were wro
ng. It Was not a parable thi
s time. It was not
a literary device.
The thrust of these exa
mples is this
fit the text.

a poetfc model does not

We cannot co to the bib
lical materials with our sop
histicated world view and acc
use them of a primitivisrl
which could not see
the usage of poetic in-,arri
nation. Parables, fables,
mytholo:zies are all
referred to, vet they are
repudiated. If we are going
to develop an
analysis of the New Testam
ert literature, we will hav
e to meet the
writers on their own
ground.

CONCLUSIU::

We cannot avid placing biblical criticism within the context
of the humanities.

Yet when we do so, a tendency arises to mold the

biblical text after the image of non-biblical models.

The immanent

methods tend to influence our idea of what the transcendent should be.
Linked to this is the change which takes place regarding the imagination
of the writer.
There are two approaches we could take to this situation.

On

the one hand, 14B could regard it pessimistically and say that the relativized text can never be known by any generation.

What passes for

knowledge, at this point, is merely cur subjective use of the material.
Cr the other hand, we could appeal to creation as the ultimate
reference point.

We could use the different cultural contexts we find

in the on-going study of the humanities.

Surely, we do not want a

non-historical text with truths that transcend our cultural contexts
nor do we want a conpletely relativized text which cannot be objectiv
ely
known.

A rigid, non-historical monologue and a relativistic dialogue

both distort the interpretive situation.
If the church places the humanities within the context of
creation, then the development and revision of conceptual tools as
well as the needs of the church in new and differing situations around
the world, may prcvide contexts which enlarf7e our understanding.

Ary

fcrmulation of hermeneutics must take the cultural stance of the interpreter into account.

It is the controlling factor.

liather than elborate abstract principles, it would be better

3.,4S.Ah
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to point to a ccrcrete example of a biblical exegete.

The best we

can find is Geerhardus Vos, late Professor of Biblic
al Theology at
Princeton Theological Seminary.

When contemporary theology sought

to abandon a dogmatic program, such as Schweitzer recommended,
eore
attention was given to the cultural context of the interpreter
in
hope of a thoroughly descriptive method.

Vos, however, accomplished

Schweitzer's goal by staying within a dogmatic tradition
and its program.

This suggests to us that the enemy yes wrongly identified.

The problem was not with dogmatics but with the nature
of literary
criticism.
In contrast, we should notice what Vos achieved within the
orbit of Reformed dogmatics.

His work is unlike much orthodox lit-

erature in that he does not operate on the defensive.

He does not

let the non-orthodox carp define the nature of the rroble
ms and then
select what is helpful and reject the rest.

His wcrk is not the

second hand use of ideas borrowed fro'- the critical
tradition.

In

Vas, orthodoxy took the offensive.
In 1912, the sane year as Schweitzer's Paul and His Irterp
reters,
Vos Published hie article, "The Eschatological Aspect
of the Pauline
Concention of the Spirit." It established him as an unread
forerunner
of later discussions.

In 1930, when Schweitzer fully elaborated his

version of Paul in The Pauline !
,ty.sticism, a series of earlier article*
were published by Vow under the title, The Pauline Fschat
ology.

Yhile

Schweitzer was nleading for a descriptive approach
arort from the dogmatic stance of the church, lies was quietly reproaching
the contents
of Faules thought in an unpreeedented fashion.
Of course, Vos did not write in a critical vacuum.

Our ccn-

•
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tention, however, would have to be that Vos was
able to go beyond
the movements of criticism precisely because of his
roots in the
tradition.
In so far as 7cs was a Reformed theologian he was not
without a bias or a pre-exegetical evaluation of the signi
ficance of the
text.

In our day, when most discussions of presuppositions
are direct-

ed to the philosophical stances of the inter
preters, it is worth notinF
the Impact of the Reformed and Lutheran traditions
.

We noticed in the

beginning how many nineteenth century critics belon
ged to the Lutheran
school. 'ee may now add the names of Schweitzer
, Cullmann, Pultmann,
Fuchs, and Tbeling.

(It is Heinrich ett's Reformed stance which makes

him dio.::7ree with Pultmann and the New Hermeneuti
c.)
Stranee as it may sound then, Vos was involved in "Refo
rmed
execesis."

An examination of his collection of articles on the
Cld

Testament, Eiblical Theology, will show how he assum
ed the Reformed
tradition of systematics at every point.
athan

Yet the work is unlike Jon-

dwards' The History of Redemption, for Vos does
not use the

history as a foil for introducing a fully devel
oped dogma associated
with the loci method.
Closely linked with this traditional stance in Refor
med theology
is the allegiance Vos had to the products of
that loci method.

It

would be incorrect to assume that this metho
d was a distortion of the
Bible so drastic that everyone who used it was in
ignorance of the text's
meaning.

Befcre commentinr on the historical weakness of the
method,

Edmund Clowrey says:
The old "proof text" aoproach his been much caricature
d; its use
by men who knew and loved the Scriotnre never ever
arsprox-im-ted the
calculated perversion practiced by some modern cults
. The %.,'est-
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minster divines, for
example, were too famili
ar with their Ribles
and with tne exeget
ical labors or John Cal
vin to ignore the co
when they were reauir
ntext
ed to furnish Scriptura
l "proofs."1
The question then cone
s, how could Vos both
assure the products
of this method and yet
work on a biblical int
erpretation which went
constructively beyond
it?
First, the Reformed tra
dition furnished Vos
with unifying
motifs for the develo
nment of his work, for
example, creation, the
people cf God, and
the kingdom of God.
Secondly, Vos had for
mulated the relations
hip between systemati
cs
and biblical the
ology.
There is no differenc
e in that one would be
more closely bound to
the Scriptures than
the other. In this the
y are wholly alike.
does the difference
or
lie in this that the
one transforms the bib
material, whereas the
lic
al
other would leave it
unmodified. Roth eoua
make the truth deposi
ll
y
ted in the Bible underg
o a transformation: bu
the difference arises
t
from the fact that the
principle by whie,1 the
transformation is effect
ed differs in each ca
se. In Biblical Theolo
this principle is one
gy
of historical, in Sys
tematic Theology it is
of logical construct
on
icn. Biblical Theolo
e
gy draws a line of development. Systematic The
ology draws a circle.
Still it should be remembered, that on the
line of historical Pro
gress there is at several points already a
beginning of correlati
on among elements of
truth in which the beg
innings of the system
atizing process can be
discerned.2
By the time Vos str
uctured the Pauline esc
hatclogy, the apostl
e
was playing the dua
l role of interpreter
of redemptive histor
y and
)%
systematic theologia
n.
The herneneutical sit
uation of author, te
xt, and reader is
developed on the Vos
-Gaffin scheme to view
the text as itself inte
rpretation. In light
of the eschatolcgica/
character of redencti
on,
1
Preaching and Biblical
Theology-, (Grand Rapi
ds, 1961), p. 17.
2 Biblical Theelogv, (Gr
and nar3ds, 1c49), pp.
24-25.
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the interpretation of the text and the reader are historically
oualified in their common program and stance.

They share a connon

Program as they interpret the redemptive work of Christ
and His ongoing ministry in the church as the Life-Giving Spirit.

They share

a common stance, despite the differences in cultural contex
t, as the
reader stands with Paul between the resurrection of Christ
and the
resurrection of the church.
Our immanent programs should take this continuity with Paul
into consideration.
an imitation of his.

qe are both exegetes.

Our activity should be

We would suggest that to learn exegesis one

should imitate an exegete such as Vos.

But Vos, in so far as he be-

comes familiar with the text, initates Paul himself.

The hermeneu-

tical guide-lines we use grow out of this familiarity.
The goal is not simply what Schweitzer would have called "to
define" Pauline thought.

Our imitation of Paul is a reproduction but

it is also an extension where we too are "doing" theology.

The reader

cannot remain detached am- explicate Paul without identifying himsel
f
with the apostle's program and stance.

The nature of the church comes

into consideration for at least the Pauline epistles are church
oriented
1
literature.
This leads us to the discontinuity between the reader and
the
text.

A distinction is made between the activity of the biblic
al writer

and his reader due to the character of the text as "canon
" or authority.
'
John writ's with an evangelical purpose which may make a
difference in our methodological treatment of him (20:31
). It ir interintin that although a separation has been maintained betwee
n the
character of John and the Synoptics, the lntter are also suppos
ed to
share John's "kerygmatic" intent.
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Its uniqueness as the transcendent Word is contained in this foundational role for the church.

In fact, the dual character of the text

may be pushed back to the dual character of the wrlter.
with the office, a gift of the Spirit.

He is the -an

The reader and the writer may

both be interpreters, but the work of the church is to build upon the
foundation and subordinate herself to its authority.
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